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Abstract
We examine the fine microstructure of commuting in a game-theoretic
setting with a continuum of commuters. Commuters’ home and work
locations can be heterogeneous. A commuter transport network is ex-
ogenous. Traﬃc speed is determined by link capacity and by local
congestion at a time and place along a link, where local congestion at
a time and place is endogenous. The model can be reinterpreted to
apply to congestion on the internet. We find suﬃcient conditions for
existence of equilibrium, that multiple equilibria are ubiquitous, and
that the welfare properties of morning and evening commute equilibria
diﬀer.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Commuting is a ubiquitous feature of the urban economy. Although the classic
literature has answered some basic questions in the field, such as whether
equilibrium commuting patterns are generally eﬃcient, surprisingly some very
important questions remain open. If cars can catch up with each other, what
can we say about endogenous equilibrium congestion? Do models without an
explicit continuous time clock give us an accurate picture of traﬃc, in the sense
that they can approximate behavior in a truly dynamic model? In contrast
with most of the literature, our model says that multiple equilibria are to be
expected. Can traﬃc be improved simply by equilibrium selection rather
than congestion pricing? Are there distinct welfare diﬀerences between Nash
equilibria for commuting from home to work in contrast with commuting from
work to home on the same network? The last question is perhaps the most
important.1 Our fine microstructure allows us to examine these diﬀerences.
There is an important application of our model to traﬃc and congestion on
the internet. Instead of cars, packets of information move over the network,
each with a given origin and destination. Both positive and normative ques-
tions concerning route choice and departure time can be addressed with our
model.2 Interestingly, both the car and internet congestion literatures began
with discrete models (at diﬀerent times), and eventually moved to continuous
flow models for tractability reasons.
The economic models employed in the commuting literature are often very
special and unrealistic; a literature review will be provided in the next subsec-
tion. One class of models features identical commuters, a very simple network
structure (for example a home, a workplace and one link between them), and
an exogenous bottleneck that results in queuing of traﬃc. It is not known to
what degree the results derived in the literature rely on these or other strong
simplifying assumptions that generally provide a reduced form viewpoint. In
contrast, we study a new class of more natural models that allows arbitrary
heterogeneity in both commuters and network structure (for example allowing
cross-commuting), where congestion is endogenous and traﬃc slows in response
1For those who wish to skip ahead to this item, please see Example 4 and Theorem 3.
2In general, one user will send out many packets. However, if these represent a negligable
proportion of the total number of packets, coordination of the strategy choices for these
packets is the same as no coordination for our purposes.
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to congestion relative to road capacity. In the last subsection of the introduc-
tion, we will provide simple examples that display the contrast between the
existing literature and our class of models.
There are important diﬀerences in implications between our framework
and the existing literature, mainly due to the detailing of fine microstructure
in our work. The reduced forms, such as an exogenous congestion function,
used elsewhere are generally not supported by this microstructure, leading
to diﬀerent results. Our model employs a microfounded, evolving congestion
concept that is suggested by the transportation engineering literature. Thus,
the conditions suﬃcient for existence of equilibrium are markedly diﬀerent.
As we shall see in the examples, it is quite natural to have multiple equilibria
in our framework, whereas the goal of the existing literature is often to prove
that equilibrium is unique. Finally, as we shall illustrate, equilibria in our
framework are qualitatively very diﬀerent from those derived in the rest of the
literature, mainly due to the fine microstructure.
1.2 Five Related Literatures
Before proceeding to our examples and analysis, we discuss the basic literature
on congestion. We divide this literature into 5 components: the transporta-
tion economics literature, the game-theoretic literature on congestion exter-
nalities, the transportation engineering literature, the mathematics of conser-
vation laws, and the electrical engineering literature on internet congestion.3
We discuss these in turn. Our work is at the junction of all of these literatures.
In contrast with our work, the first two literatures tend not to study dynamic
micro behavior along roads. The second two literatures take individual be-
havior as fixed, so the models are mechanical. The last literature tends not
to examine Nash equilibrium, but rather other positive or normative ideas.
The older literature on transportation economics deals with models with no
time clock or with just one route or bottleneck where traﬃc queues. Beckmann
et al. (1956) provide a model of rush hour where traﬃc flows are constant.
They analyze optimum and equilibrium in a stylized model with no explicit
time clock, but with a representative commuter. Vickrey (1963, 1969) pro-
vided the classical analysis of congestion externalities, pricing, and infrastruc-
ture investment. Arnott et al. (1993) examine primarily welfare under various
pricing schemes when there is only one route or bottleneck, but allow elastic
3These literatures tend not to cite each other, rendering literature reviews labor-intensive
and occasionally puzzling, due to terminological diﬀerences.
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trip demand and use continuous time. Traﬃc does not slow down due to
congestion, but rather queues at a bottleneck with limited capacity. In their
conclusions (p. 177), they note: “In the context of rush hour traﬃc conges-
tion, for example, models should be developed which derive hypercongestion
(traﬃc-jam situations) from driving behavior, solve for equilibrium on a con-
gested network, and account for heterogeneity among users...” This is what
we attempt.
The contemporary literature on transportation economics uses the termi-
nology “dynamic traﬃc assignment problem” for the kind of model we shall
construct. Merchant and Nemhauser (1978) initiate the modern literature by
proposing a discrete time model with a single destination node where events
in a link of the transport network at a given time, namely the number of cars
entering the link, the cost of traversing the link as a function of traﬃc, and the
number of cars exiting a link as a function of traﬃc, are all exogenous black
boxes. They provide an example and examine algorithms for finding a social
optimum. Ross and Yinger (2000) embed a model of point congestion similar
to ours in a classic urban monocentric city model with both land consumption
and a symmetric radial road network. This is similar to a simple network with
only one commuting corridor. Traﬃc flow is continuous but not necessarily
smooth. They show that the only equilibrium in a general urban equilibrium
version of a commuting model with continuous departure times and flow con-
gestion but no bottlenecks is an unreasonable one with a never ending rush
hour. As we shall explain below, by allowing a large but finite number of de-
parture times and randomizing departures over small intervals between these
discrete departure times, with some eﬀort we can overcome these diﬃculties.
In our context, traﬃc flow might not be continuous. Konishi (2004) considers
existence, uniqueness and eﬃciency of Nash equilibrium primarily in a static
model but also in a discrete time dynamic model with a simple network, em-
ploying Schmeidler’s (1973) theorem4 as we do. He uses bottlenecks whereas
we use speed reductions resulting from congestion. Konishi’s work is quite
complementary to ours, as we are not concerned with the issues he addresses,
namely existence of equilibrium in static models with a finite number of com-
muters, conditions suﬃcient for uniqueness of equilibrium in static models
with a continuum of commuters, and existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
in dynamic models of simple networks with exogenous bottlenecks.
4To apply Schmeidler’s work to obtain Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it is important
that the set of pure strategies be finite. In our model, the interpretation is that the set of
departure time strategies is finite.
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An independent, modern literature in transportation economics examines
necessary conditions at a Nash equilibrium for the dynamic traﬃc assignment
problem. Heydecker and Addison (2005) consider what happens along a link
as a black box, and derive such a condition. Of course, if such a black box is
made more specific, the necessary condition can be refined. Zhang and Zhang
(2010) use a bottleneck model and obtain a more specialized condition.
In their survey, de Palma and Fosgerau (2011, p. 208) conclude: “The
extension of the dynamic model to large networks remains a diﬃcult problem.
So far, existence and uniqueness of equilibrium have not been established (in
spite of many attempts).”
The game-theoretic literature on externalities, for example Sandholm (2001),
has the potential to be useful in our context. However, the strong symmetry
assumptions used, that yield strong and interesting conclusions, exclude almost
all of the games of interest to us. For example, they exclude the simple special
case of our model where there are two nodes called home and work with one
link between them, but two departure times. Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007)
study congestion games with a continuum of players, but their assumptions on
congestion rule out the type of dynamic micro-interaction along a link that is
the focus of our work. Sandholm (2007) considers an evolutionary approach
to setting optimal tolls in the case where there is a finite number of iden-
tical commuters (so they have the same home and work locations) modified
by an idiosyncratic preference component, without the symmetry assumption
but with further structure on the evolutionary process.5 Hu (2010) explores
Nash equilibrium with continuous departures for a single commuting corridor
for one morning rush hour. It is shown that with a specific dynamic for equi-
librium selection, the equilibrium exists and is unique. As we shall illustrate
in the last subsection of the introduction, multiple equilibria are quite natural
in models of commuting.
Naturally, the transportation engineering literature is concerned more with
practical traﬃc issues than with the questions we pose; see, for example, Da-
ganzo (2008). Typically this literature takes the behavior of individuals,
namely their choice of routes and departure times, as exogenous. Thus, Nash
equilibrium is not studied.6 For example, Zhu and Marcotte (2000) use pre-
5It is also interesting to inquire how tolls would be implemented in practice in these
models, since in theory the toll is based on the overall strategy chosen, namely the route
and/or departure time. Would toll booths along the route be able to implement this?
6For example, the first appearance of a utility function in Daganzo (2008) is at the bottom
of p. 315. The body of the book ends at the top of p. 319.
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determined (exogenous) departure times. The closest relative to our model
in this literature is the cell transmission version of the Lighthill-Whitman-
Richards (LWR) model; see Daganzo (2008) section 4.4.6. There are some
important diﬀerences. First, the LWR model takes departures as exogenous
and possibly smooth, whereas we do not. Second, like most models of traﬃc,
the LWR model employs queues or bottlenecks when there is congestion. In
contrast, we assume that traﬃc slows as a function of traﬃc density. These
two important diﬀerences express themselves as diﬀerences in the equilibrium
behavior of the models.7 More recent examples include Han et al (2013)8 and
Han et al (2015).
Turning next to the mathematics literature, the topics we consider here
typically fall into two literatures. In essence, our mathematical problem on
one link boils down to a conservation law coupled with a discontinuous dif-
ferential equation. Even with just one link between an origin and destination
with exogenous departure times and homogeneous commuters, existence and
uniqueness of the resulting traﬃc pattern is a diﬃcult question that requires in-
teresting assumptions and techniques to resolve. A major issue is the existence
and uniqueness of behavior of the system when the initial conditions can be
discontinuous. This is important to us, as we don’t want to place restrictions
on the joint behavior of individuals when we eventually consider Nash equi-
librium. The mathematics were introduced in Bressan (2000, chapter 6) and
Garavello and Piccoli (2006); that work is based on Bressan (1988) and Bres-
san and Shen (1998).9 The key paper for our purposes is the seminal work of
Strub and Bayen (2006), who remark in their conclusions (p. 564), “However,
7In other parts of the transportation engineering literature, existence and uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium is studied in the context of a bottleneck model, using an S-shaped wish
curve (defining ideal bottleneck exit times). In these models, it is unclear what happens if
an atom of commuters arrives at the bottleneck at the same time, or if the fragile condition
of an S-shaped wish curve is violated - the complement appears to be open and dense in the
set of wish curves.
8In addition to queues, this work also features a highly non-standard notion of Nash
equilibrium.
9Although the motivation for Bressan (2000) is the simple traﬃc problem with one home
location, one work location, and one link, the mathematical problem solved in this book is
diﬀerent from the economic problem that motivates it. This will cause us some headaches.
In particular, the initial condition used in the book is the traﬃc at various locations along
the link at time 0, trivially 0 in our model. Traﬃc is not allowed to enter the link after
time 0. We are much more interested in boundary conditions that, for an arbitrary time,
give the traﬃc entering a link at location 0. Nevertheless, the mathematics introduced in
this book is very useful.
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results are still lacking in order to generalize our approach to a real highway
network. For such a network, PDEs are coupled through boundary condi-
tions, which makes the problem harder to pose.”10 Once we have introduced
notation and concepts, we shall remark further on both related literature in
mathematics and alternative approaches to solving the induced mathematical
problem.11 An important contribution of Strub and Bayen (2006) is actually
the definition of a solution to the mathematical problem of determining flow in
the one link system with exogenous departures, since there were issues of either
existence or uniqueness with many of the previous attempts. The technical
diﬃculties in the literature are partly the result of working with functions of
bounded variation with a two dimensional domain: time and distance. The
(discontinuous) conservation law tells us that cars are not lost over a link, with
initial condition zero cars on the link and boundary conditions corresponding
to departure of cars. The conservation law is coupled with a (discontinuous)
diﬀerential equation that gives progress of a car over the link. An important
mathematical problem is relating properties of functions on two dimensions
that are of bounded variation to their variation on each dimension separately
as well as on a cone. As shown by Bressan (1988) but not discussed in more
recent work in this literature, locally bounded variation on this cone is suﬃ-
cient to solve the discontinuous ordinary diﬀerential equation, associated with
a conservation law, for progress on a link.
In the end, we are able to embed the more elementary framework of Strub
and Bayen (2006) in a model with an arbitrary transport network, heteroge-
neous commuters and endogenous choice of departure times and routes, exam-
ining Nash equilibrium as well as Pareto optimum. Unfortunately, we cannot
apply their results directly, but must open up the details of their clever proof.
The final literature related to our work is the literature on internet conges-
tion. Although we interpret our model as traﬃc on roads for consistency of
exposition, it applies as well to packets on links in the internet. A fine survey
10There are many challenges that we must address to extend their results from one link to
many. For example, it is diﬃcult to prove that the link exit density has the same properties
as the link entry density, that is used as the entry density for another link. A secondary
challenge is that boundary conditions are formulated in terms of density (cars per mile)
when they should be formulated in terms of volume (cars per hour). Although we take the
proper approach for boundary conditions using volume, the technicalities can be simplified
some if we were to use density.
11We note in frustration that much of the literature cited here is motivated by mathematics
rather than economics. Beyond Strub and Bayen (2006), there is no result we can apply
directly even to the case of two nodes and one link.
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of this literature can be found in Jacobsson (2008). Due to the complexity of
the discrete model, a continuous model was developed by Kelly et al (1998),
forming a foundation for our work. Much of the literature has a focus on
exogenous departures and routes, not Nash equilibrium. Other parts of the
literature, such as Kelly et al (1998), focus on steady states of the dynamic
model with congestion pricing, or what we call a static model with congestion
pricing. There is likely an unexplored relationship with potential games, as
represented for example in Sandholm (2007).
1.3 Preview
In summary, the main diﬀerence between our work and most of the literature
is that we use the fine microstructure from transportation engineering and the
mathematics of conservation laws to address more macro economic questions.
We do not use exogenous departure and route choices, nor do we employ
bottlenecks or queues. Instead we allow endogenous choice of departure times
and routes, but require that traﬃc slow down as a function of endogenous
congestion on an arbitrary transportation network. To our knowledge, this
represents a new class of models of commuting that has fewer black boxes (such
as delay functions in the standard literature) and, more importantly, diﬀerent
properties compared with others.
Although the notation used to describe the models formally is burdensome,
we will give examples and intuition for the results in addition to the techni-
calities. We formulate both a static model, where time plays no role, and a
dynamic model, where it does play a role. We assume that commuters have
an inelastic demand for one trip per day to work. Future work should extend
this to elastic demand.
Our results and the outline of the balance of the paper are as follows.
Although classical results concerning Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum
are replicated in our context, we highlight novelties. In the next subsection of
the introduction, we detail and preview our results with minimal notation by
using the simplest example, a network with two nodes and one link where all
commuters live at one node and commute to their jobs at the other. In Section
2, we give our notation and specify the general static (timeless) and dynamic
models. At this point, we prove classical results in our context, but also find
assumptions suﬃcient for existence of a unique flow of traﬃc across links over
time given a set of initial conditions (corresponding to a fixed strategy profile)
in the dynamic model. Moving on to Nash equilibrium, we find conditions
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suﬃcient to prove it exists, and show that it is generally not unique. Section
3 gives our applications. First, we show that the static model cannot be
viewed as a reduced form of the dynamic model, where time is explicit. Then
we study the welfare properties of Nash equilibrium in the context of a tree
network in the dynamic model. Nash equilibrium of the morning commute
will generally be ineﬃcient, whereas there exists a Nash equilibrium of the
evening commute that is eﬃcient. Finally, Section 4 gives our conclusions.
All proofs are contained in an Appendix.
1.4 Example
1.4.1 Our Basic Model
We begin with a simple example to illustrate how the model works and the
intuition behind our results. Consider commuters uniformly distributed on
the interval [0 1] with nodes 1 and 2. Each commuter commutes from node 1
to node 2 each day. For simplicity, we only consider the morning rush hour at
this juncture. Denote the capacity of the link by  ∈ R+. Suppose that the
time it takes to travel the link at the speed limit is (1 2) = 1. In the static
model, the travel time is given by 1 if the average number of travellers does not
exceed capacity  of the road, and by 1 otherwise. This means that if road
link capacity is exceeded, then traﬃc slows down in proportion to the ratio of
excess commuters to capacity, max(1 1). For example, if  = 12, then the
travel time for a commuter on the link is 2. There really are no choices here
for the commuters or a social planner optimizing eﬃciency, since the route is
fixed and the model is static; there are no departure times to be chosen.
Now consider a dynamic version of the model. Route choice is still fixed,
but departure (and consequent arrival) times are a choice variable of the com-
muters. We model departure times in R+, and we call the required arrival
time at the destination node 2 (say 9 AM)  ∈ R+. There is no penalty for
arriving at work early, but the penalty for arriving at work late is ∞. This
is mainly for illustration. We shall consider more general penalties for both
early and late arrival in the remaining sections. They add some complications.
Again, in this simple model there is no route choice. But there is a choice of
departure time. First, we illustrate how, for any choice of departure times by
all commuters, the travel time to the destination node 2 can be computed. It is
assumed that the latter is minimized by each individual commuter at a Nash
equilibrium (given the choices of others), and the social planner maximizes
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a utilitarian welfare function that is minus the integral of commuting times
subject to the arrival constraint.
The speed of a particular cohort of commuters who depart at the same time
is computed as follows. Begin with the local density of commuters on the road
at a particular place on the route and at a particular time. This local density
at a given place and time is computed as the limit of neighborhoods on the
road of total (measure of) commuters in the neighborhood divided by the one
dimensional size of that neighborhood. The limit is taken as the length of the
neighborhood goes to zero. The result will be the density of commuters (with
respect to distance) at that place and time. Then, as in the static model,
traﬃc slows down in proportion to the ratio of excess commuter density to
capacity.
An example will help illustrate. Again consider the commuters uniformly
distributed on [0 1]. Suppose that all the commuters at 0 depart at time 0,
all the commuters at 1 depart at time 1, and so forth. Set the arrival time
 = 2. We compute traﬃc speeds (in this case, the arrival time constraint
will not bind). With these departure times, when road capacity is high so
that  ≥ 1, then capacity does not bind. The unit interval of commuters
moves from origin to destination at full speed and perfect synchrony, and the
local density of traﬃc is always 1 except for commuters with labels 0 and 1.
The density around them is 1
2
since there is nobody on one side of them (for
example the commuters with label 0 have nobody in front of them). But this
does not alter their speed, since they are already at the speed limit. In theory,
at least, commuters can catch up with those ahead of them (if the ones ahead
are travelling slower) and slow themselves down.
What if   1? We consider two simple patterns. First, suppose that
commuters depart exactly as in the preceding paragraph. Set the arrival time
 = 1 + 1. Traﬃc slows down by a factor of 1 relative to the no congestion
case; thus, traﬃc speed for the commuters is uniform at . It takes 1 time to
traverse the link, so the last commuters (labelled 1) reach the destination at
1
 + 1. The local density of commuters is 1 during the commute. Call this
the congested commuting pattern.
Now consider the same general departure pattern as in the preceding para-
graph, but with commuters labelled 0 beginning travel at time 0, whereas
commuters labelled 1 begin their trip at time 1 . So the density of commuters
departing at any time is . Set the arrival time  = 1+1. Since local density
is the same as capacity, all commuters travel at the speed limit. Thus, travel
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time for all commuters is 1. Call this the uncongested commuting pattern.
These two simple commuting patterns, or strategy profiles, serve to il-
lustrate the computation of local density and speed. Of course, the local
density and speed calculations can be much more complicated in, for example,
more intricate commuting networks or for more intricate departure patterns.
The simple patterns also serve to illustrate the important role played by ar-
rival time. It is rather evident that for the fixed arrival time as specified
at  = 1 + 1, these strategy profiles are Nash equilibria. Notice that all
commuters reach work by the arrival time  for either pattern, but travel
time is longer for the congested commuting pattern. Thus, welfare can diﬀer
across dynamic commuting patterns even for this simple example. It is evi-
dent that the uncongested commuting pattern Pareto dominates the congested
commuting pattern.
1.4.2 The Classical Model with Queues
A crucial comparison is between our model, with endogenous congestion and
speed, and the classical models of the literature that use queues. We argue
that the equilibrium (or even disequilibrium) behavior of our model is diﬀerent
and much more realistic, illustrated as follows.
First, consider the model detailed previously. For the purpose of com-
parison, modify the simple example that we have used by setting uncongested
travel time (1 2) = 1
2
, arrival time  = 2, and capacity  = 1
2
. In this
case, the uncongested commuting pattern has departure times uniformly dis-
tributed over [0 2] with density 1
2
. The time cost is 1
2
for each commuter, but
the commuter departing at time 2 arrives late, so this pattern will not be an
equilibrium pattern. For the congested commuting pattern, departure times
are uniformly distributed over [0 1] with density 1, so it takes each commuter
time 1 to traverse the link. Thus, the last commuter arrives at time 2, and the
congested commuting pattern remains an equilibrium in the modified example.
We turn next to a model with queuing. There are many variations on the
bottleneck model, particularly in continuous time. For example, Arnott et
al. (1993) assume that it takes no time to get from home to a bottleneck, and
that after exiting the bottleneck, the commuter immediately arrives at work.
The variation we use is closer to our model, and is due to Zhang and Zhang
(2010). A link consists of two parts, a main body first and then a queue at the
end. The main body has infinite capacity so traﬃc flows at the speed limit
independent of any congestion. The queue or bottleneck at the end of the
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main body operates with limited capacity, using a first-in-first-out principle.
For our particular example, it takes time 1
2
for any commuter to traverse the
main body (independent of congestion), and the queue allows density 1
2
to exit
the queue at any given time.
What does Nash equilibrium with a queue look like for this example?
Everyone leaves as soon as possible (at time 0), arrives at the bottleneck at
time 1
2
, and the last commuter leaves the bottleneck at time 5
2
, late for work.
Here, we assume that if everyone arrives at the bottleneck at the same time, the
order in which they proceed is random. This equilibrium does not resemble
at all the one obtained using our model of endogenous congestion.
1.4.3 Comparison of the Static and Dynamic Models
Consider next the comparison of the static with the dynamic model. We
return to the simple, basic example used at the beginning of this subsection
where uncongested travel time is (1 2) = 1. The first pattern, the congested
commuting pattern, we study for the case   1 seems to be the analog of
the static case, since traﬃc speed is constricted. But the second, uncongested
pattern does not seem to have an analog. Thus, the static and dynamic models
have diﬀerent Nash equilibrium predictions. Moreover, if the dynamic analog
of the static equilibrium is the congested commuting pattern, it is Pareto
dominated by another pattern present in the dynamic model but disallowed
by the static model.
In fact, we can say more. For example, even in the case where the equi-
libria of the static and dynamic models appear to be the same, if we average
congestion for the dynamic model over time and distances on the link, many
times and distances have zero commuters and zero congestion. For instance,
this happens at distances along the link in our example that the first com-
muters have not yet reached. So aggregating the equilibrium of the dynamic
model this way will not generate the static model equilibrium, since the flows
in the dynamic model will appear diluted.
An alternative criterion for comparing the static and dynamic model equi-
libria is to ask that there be at least one time and a distance along each link
such that the equilibrium flows of the models are the same. An example rel-
evant to this idea is to use three identical links in series, so that at any given
time in equilibrium commuters in the dynamic model are on at most two of the
links, unless the links are operating below capacity. Then there is no time at
which the flows on all three links are non-zero simultaneously. In section 3.1
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below, we describe how to extend this example so that there is no equilibrium
of the dynamic model even remotely resembling the equilibrium of the static
model.
With the model specified as we have outlined, generally a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies or an optimum might not exist. So in what follows, for
the dynamic model, we must simplify the problem. This is accomplished
by using a fixed, finite set of possible departure times that divide equally
the time scale in the model. When commuters choose a departure time,
they are distributed uniformly over the interval with midpoint their chosen
departure time, and length equal to the distance between allowable departure
times. With this structure, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and an
optimum exist. Moreover, for our example, the congested and uncongested
commuting patterns we have specified are Nash equilibria of the model, and
the uncongested commuting pattern is Pareto optimal.
What follows below just makes the ideas behind our simple examples for-
mal and general, for instance allowing an arbitrary commuting network where
commuters have various diﬀerent origins and destinations.
2 The Commuting Model
Readers who wish to understand the content of the work through examples only
can focus on Examples 1-4 below and then skip to section 4.
2.1 The Static Model: Equilibrium and Optimum
Here we lay out the details of a game with an atomless measure space (con-
tinuum) of players; a finite set of nodes at which the players live, or to which
they commute, or through which they commute; and a finite set of transport
links between the nodes with exogenous capacity.
To begin, the measure space of commuters is given by ( C ) where  is
the set of commuters, C is a -algebra on , and  is a positive, non-atomic
measure.12 We assume that singletons of the form {} for  ∈  are in C; that
for all  ∈ , ({}) = 0; and 0  () ∞.
The origins and destinations in the commuting network are given by a
finite set of nodes, denoted by  = 1 2  . Let N = {1 2  }. The
12Skorokhod’s theorem implies that we could without loss of generality restrict attention
to the unit interval with Lebesgue measure.
13
commuting network itself is given by a finite set of links between nodes. The
capacity of any direct link (with no intermediate nodes) between nodes  and
 is given by  ∈ [0∞], whereas  =∞. If a direct link between nodes
 and  does not exist, then  = 0.
What remains is to specify the strategies and payoﬀs of the commuters.
In the static game, there is no choice of time of departure or arrival. There
is only route choice. We assume that each commuter has a fixed origin node
and a fixed destination node, with inelastic demand for exactly one trip be-
tween the origin and destination. Thus, there is an exogenous, measurable
origin map  :  → N and an exogenous, measurable destination map  :
 → N . Notice that there can be heterogeneity among commuters in origins
and destinations. This will create heterogeneity in the reduced form utility
functions of the commuters.
Let  be the map that projects a vector onto its coordinate . A route,
denoted by , is a vector of length no less than 2 but no more than  ,13 Next
we define the set of all routes:
R =
© ∈ N  | for  = 1 2   − 1 ()+1()  0ª
R ≡
∞[
=2
R
To avoid trivial situations, we assume that if there is a positive measure
of commuters with a particular origin and destination, that there is some
route between the nodes. A commuting length map is a measurable map
 :  → {2 3 }. A commuting route structure is a pair ( ) where  is a
commuting length map and  is a measurable map  :  → N such that for
 = 1 2   − 1 ()(+1)  0, and almost surely for  ∈ , 1(()) = ()
and ()(()) = ().
Given a commuting route structure ( ), its flow  ∈ R2+ is given by
() = ({ ∈  | ∃ ∈ {1 2  () − 1} with (()) =  and
+1(()) = }) for  = 1 2  . We assume that the length of the link
between nodes  and  is () ≥ 0 for  = 1 2  . However, if the
link is congested, then the travel time increases. For our examples, it increases
in proportion to the excess of commuters above capacity, ()() ·().14 For
instance, if the number of commuters is twice the capacity of a link, then the
13We can generalize this to an arbitrary but finite upper bound on the length of a route
at the cost of more complicated notation.
14There is an issue of normalization here, namely whether  is divided by  or not. In
essence, it depends on whether a link that is twice as long is half as congested for the same
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travel time is doubled. We ask that the reader bear this special case in mind,
since we use it in all of our examples to give concrete intuition.
More generally, we can allow traﬃc to slow down according to any well-
behaved function of the number of commuters at a distance on a link and link
capacity. Therefore, we specify the function  : R+×R+ → R++ where  ( )
is the speed of traﬃc with density  on a link with capacity . We assume
that for fixed ,  is continuous and non-increasing in  . For our examples,
 ( ) ≡ min
n

  1
o
.
The time cost of a commuting structure ( ) for commuter  is
(  ) = (1)
()−1X
=1
((()) +1(()))
 (((()) +1(())) ((()) +1(())))
Thus, − is the objective or payoﬀ function for each commuter. The utilitarian
welfare function for the static model is
( ) = −
Z

(  )()
A Nash equilibrium of the static model is a commuting structure ( ) such
that almost surely for  ∈ , there is no route  of length  for commuter 
such that
(  ) 
−1X
=1
((()) +1(()))
 ((() +1()) (() +1()))
Existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies can be proved by applying
Schmeidler (1973, Theorems 1 and 2). Rosenthal (1973) proves that a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies exists even when there is a finite number of
commuters. Sandholm (2001) shows that equilibrium exists and is unique
under additional conditions, primarily that speed is strictly decreasing in link
usage  .
Next we prove (informally) that an optimum exists. The problem can
easily be reduced to optimization of the utilitarian welfare function over a
number of commuters on the link. This depends on the interpretation of the static model,
whether congestion is viewed as a pulse of commuters or whether they are uniformly spread
out over the link. In this paper, we take the view that in the model without time, twice as
many commuters on a link results in twice the congestion, no matter the length of the link.
However, if one takes the view that length of the link matters, the result is simply division
of our  by , and this makes no essential diﬀerence in the the results we obtain. As we
show in section 3, interpretation of the static model is diﬃcult.
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compact set as follows. Notice first that there is a finite number of types of
commuters, defined by their origin-destination pairs. Instead of using route
choice for each commuter, employ as control variables the measure of each
type following each route. Thus, the social planner controls a finite number
of variables in a compact set using a continuous objective, so a maximum is
attained.
Example 1: We note that due to the congestion externality, the Nash equi-
libria are unlikely to be Pareto (or utilitarian) optimal. To see this informally,
consider an example with 3 nodes. All commuters travel between nodes 1 and
3. There is a direct route, and an alternate route that runs via node 2. The
alternate route takes longer than the direct route for each fixed number of
commuters below capacity because it requires a longer distance of travel. For
example, each road has capacity 1 and takes 1 unit of time to cross, so the
longer route uses 2 units of time when running below capacity, whereas the
shorter route takes 1 unit of time when running below capacity.
2
% &
1 −→ 3
Suppose that there is measure 5
2
of commuters. A Nash equilibrium of this
model has the direct route running above capacity, with measure 2 commuters
using it for a total travel time of 2, and the indirect route running below
capacity (5 measure, with a total travel time of 2) such that the travel time
to work for each commuter is the same. To create a Pareto improvement over
the Nash equilibrium, simply move some commuters (say measure 5) from the
direct to the indirect route. The travel time on the indirect route (namely 2)
is the same as at the Nash equilibrium, even for the commuters switched to
that route, whereas the travel time for those on the direct route decreases (to
15).
2.2 The Dynamic Model: Equilibrium and Optimum
The basics of the dynamic model are the same as those for the static model.
To diﬀerentiate the notation, we will add “dynamic” to the names and add
time  as an argument of functions. In the dynamic model, each commuter
chooses both a departure time (from their origin node) and a route. Routes
were discussed in the previous subsection. We allow a commuter to depart at
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any time  ∈ [0  ]. As we shall see shortly, it is important that this set be
bounded.
A dynamic commuting route structure is a triple (  ) where  :  →
[0  ] is a measurable function giving departure times for all commuters,  is
a commuting length map and  is a measurable map  :  → N such that
almost surely for  ∈ , 1(()) = () and ()(()) = ().
At this juncture, there is an issue concerning the detail in which we model
congestion on each link in the dynamic model. It varies in the literature
we have cited. The simplest way to model this is to look only at average
congestion on a link. More complicated is to assume that as traﬃc ebbs and
flows, the congestion at the end of the link determines traﬃc speed on the
entire link. The most detailed model allows cars to catch up with each other
over the course of a link. We use this most detailed model, but assume that
link capacity is constant across the link. This is without loss of generality,
provided that capacity changes only a finite number of times on a link. In
that case, we just add more nodes and links with diﬀerent capacities in series.
We shall define commuter progress from origin to destination through a
diﬀerential equation in distance. But first we must define progress on each
component of a route in a dynamic route structure. Fix a dynamic route
structure (  ). The basic idea is this. From departure time to the end of
the first link, we follow the diﬀerential equation for congestion for the first link,
and then begin on the second link, and so forth. For notational simplicity,
for  = 1  (), define  () to be the time that node (()) is reached.
Evidently,  1() = ().
Given a dynamic commuting route structure (  ), we shall associate
with it a function (() ) that gives as its value the distance travelled
on link  by commuter  at time  who begins travel on link  at time
(). In the end, this function will increasing in its second argument but
decreasing in its first argument. Does such a function exist, and is it unique?
Fix such a function b. To ease notation, compute inductively
 +1() = inf{ 0  0 | (())+1(())( ()  0) = ((()) +1(())}
(2)
We can then compute its flow at time  on link  at distance ∆, calledb : N 2 × R2+ → R+.15 It is given by the (possibly discontinuous) partial
15In terms of notation,  will be a scalar representing an arbitrary value of the flow,
whereas b is a flow function.
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diﬀerential equation or conservation law :
 b(  ∆)
 +
Φ(  ∆)
∆ = 0 (3)
where
Φ(  ∆) ≡ 
³ b(  ∆) ()´ · b(  ∆) (4)
is defined to be the flux. The flux is the volume of commuters passing through
a point per unit of time. We abuse notation slightly and sometimes write
Φ() =  ( ) · 
For our example, note that Φ = min { }.
Equation (3) is actually the fundamental conservation law of transportation
economics applied to this model. As explained in Bressan (2000, equation 1.2),
if we fix an interval of locations on a link, the measure of commuters inside
this interval can only change over time from inflows into the interval from the
left and outflows from the interval to the right. Another interpretation of
equation (3) states that the change with respect to time in commuter density
at a given place and time can be found by looking at the change in the flux
(commuters per hour) at preceding locations nearby.
Next we compute
b(() )
 = 
³ b(  b(() )) ()´ (5)
This describes the progress made by commuters on each link of the entire
dynamic commuting route structure for any time  . This is the coupled
discontinuous diﬀerential equation discussed in the introduction.
Unfortunately, the coupled system defining b and b, namely (2), (3), and
(5), is technically challenging. The reason is that we cannot restrict , the
function defining the departure strategies of players, beyond assuming that it
is a measurable function. Each individual makes a choice, and this is not
necessarily coordinated. Discontinuities in departure flows or densities can
result in discontinuities in b that rule out our ability to use standard
techniques from the theory of ordinary diﬀerential equations as well as the
contraction mapping theorem. Instead, we use Bressan (1988).
Even if we can retrieve a well-defined b for each  function, the issue
then becomes the fact that there might not exist a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies, since the space of pure strategies is a continuum. Schmeidler (1973)
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relies heavily on the fact that the number of pure strategies available to players
is finite.
We solve both of the problems at once by simplifying the dynamic model.
Fix  where  is an even integer, and define the departure strategy space to
be {  3   ( − 1)}. This makes the strategy space finite. We assume
that all the commuters who choose, say,  will be randomly and uniformly
distributed on (0 2), those who choose the strategy 3 will be randomly
and uniformly distributed on (2  4), and so forth. The examples in the
introduction and that follow fit this framework because they use a uniform
distribution of departure times.
We begin by giving the intuition for speed calculations, and then provide a
formal proof of existence and uniqueness of the function b , from which every-
thing else can be calculated. For example, b can be calculated from
(5). We emphasize that that the description that follows is provided for intu-
ition about how the system works only. The formal proof that given departure
times and routes, the flows exist and are uniquely determined is technical and
does not rely at all on the intuition we provide.
For speed calculations, it is useful to define some concepts. A threshold is
a location on the network where the speed of commuters is diﬀerent on the two
sides of the threshold at a given time. An important example of a threshold is
a node. Of course, a node is a form of a stationary threshold, since it doesn’t
move over time. Next we will investigate thresholds that move, appear and
disappear. An example of a threshold of this type is the boundary between
two cohorts, where a cohort is defined as a group of commuters with the same
route and departure time choices.
Fix a dynamic commuting route structure (  ). Let b(  0) = ()+
 0, where  0 is a random variable uniformly distributed on (−  ), denote the
actual departure time of commuter , that diﬀers from the chosen departure
time () by at most  as described just above. To reduce the notational
burden, we shall generally suppress the second argument ( 0) in any functionb . Then b 1() = b(). In general, given b , we will define inductively b +1.
Fix any origin node  and destination node  6= . On each segment ,
define a set of commuters who travel together on a link as:
() ≡ {0 ∈  | (0) = (); for some  ≤ (),
1(()) = 1((0)),, −1(()) = −1((0));
−1(()) = −1((0)) = , (()) = ((0)) = }
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Assume for this informal description that Φ is strictly increasing in  . Then
the default speed for commuter  is given by
() =  ¡Φ−1 ((())2)  ()¢
The default speed might be counterfactual, but it is a useful construct.
At the default speed, intervals of commuters never overlap with each other.
When they never overlap, the time on this link is exactly ()(), sob +1() = b ()+()(). Similarly, (b () ) = () · [ −b ()]
where (()) = . But there are two other possibilities beyond this first
case. The second case is when commuters using diﬀerent routes blend with
each other or separate beginning at a node; this is actually a generalization
of the concept of default speed. The third case is if a segment of commuters
catches up with another along a link. We consider each of these in turn.
The second case that is possible in the model is when commuters using
diﬀerent routes blend or separate at a node. For the case where they separate,
if they are not combined with commuters using other routes, they move at the
default speed on the link. But this is just to give intuition. Formally, defining
the set of commuters approaching link  from link 0 at the same time:
0( ) ≡ {0 ∈  | 0(b −1(0)b ()) ∈ ((0)−  (0));
(()) = , +1(()) = ;
((0)) = , +1((0)) =  and −1((0)) = 0 }
the speed of commuters is given by:
∗() = 
ÃX
0 6=
lim→0
(0( ))
 + Φ
−1 ((())2)  ()
!
Provided that they don’t catch up with anyone else, their time on the link is ex-
actly ()∗(), so b +1() = b ()+()∗()whereas (b () ) =
() · [ − b ()] where (()) = . This is actually the most general
form of the speed and time functions. Notice that since the number of types
is finite, the denominator of the right hand side of the last equation actually
is almost surely constant for  suﬃciently small.
On each segment , we say that commuter  catches up with commuter
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0 on link  if
(()) = ((0)) = , +1(()) = +1((0)) = b (0)  b ()
()
∗()− ∗(0)  b ()− b (0)
The slower commuter, who is unaﬀected, continues on at the same speed as
before the faster one catches them. If commuter  catches up with commuter
0 on link , define the catch up16 time, for (()) = ((0)) = ,
+1(()) = +1((0)) = , as  ∗ = b () + ∗(0)·[()− (0)]∗()−∗(0) . At the first
time when a member of one cohort (defined above) catches up with a member
of another cohort along a link, a new threshold is created at this time and
distance. As it crosses the threshold, the traﬃc in the faster cohort slows down
to the speed of the cohort immediately in front of them by increasing its density
at the threshold to match that in the slower cohort. Thus, for all 00 ∈  with
((00)) = , +1((00)) = , then b+1(00) =  ∗ + ()−( ()∗)∗(0)
whereas (b(00) ) = (b ()  ∗) + [ −  ∗] · ∗(0) for all    ∗ on
this link.
The threshold itself moves along the link at speed
∗(0)− 
∗() · lim→0 b(  −  (b(00)  − ))
lim→0 b(  −  (b()  − )) 
We shall remark on this further after a formal statement of the first result.
To prepare for this first result, let us make explicit the assumptions we will
use.
Assumption 1: For each fixed , speed 0   ( ) ∞ is Lipschitz
continuous and non-increasing in  .
Assumption 1 means that car speed with no congestion is bounded, speed
is a continuous (thought not necessarily smooth) function of congestion, and
speed does not increase with more cars. As an alternative to assuming that 
is Lipschitz, we could directly assume that Φ is Lipschitz, as that is what we
use. But since both  and  are bounded (see below after Assumption 2), 
Lipschitz implies that Φ is Lipschitz.
Next, we need some preparation for Assumption 2. Eventually, we will
need a bound on the total variation of boundary conditions at the start of a
16Also known as ketchup.
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link that is uniform across links. The purpose is to have a compact space
that we will use to find a fixed point. A suﬃcient condition (and necessary
for uniform boundedness) is a hierarchy of links that we will specify next. Let
the set of links17 be denoted by:
L ≡ {() ∈ N ×N |  6= }
We postulate a complete preorder on L denoted by º, with its asymmetric
part denoted by Â. Recall that R is the set of all possible routes. Next, we
shall restrict routes to R ⊆ R.
Assumption 2: Routes  are restricted to:
 ∈ R ≡
[
=2
© ∈ R | For all  = 2 3   − 1, (() +1()) Â (−1() ()),
() 6= () for  6= }
There are two pieces to this assumption. First, we have restricted route
length to  or less. In fact, all that is needed is a finite upper bound on
route length. We choose  for simplicity. The assumption that nodes are not
repeated along a route makes indexing progress along the route easy. These
assumptions are made mainly to keep notation simple.
The second piece is more interesting. Let us begin with the mathematics.
The purpose of this assumption is to provide a uniform upper bound on total
variation (across time) of boundary or entry conditions for the node at the
start of a link. Without this upper bound, we lose both compactness of the
space of initial conditions and the ability to solve the diﬀerential equation (5).
We need compactness for a fixed point theorem, and the ability to solve the
diﬀerential equation in order to compute travel times and payoﬀs.
To obtain such an upper bound, we must examine behavior when cohorts
merge at a node and travel the next link together. Variation in density in
one cohort can be transmitted to the other at the initial node. Thus, total
variation can build up. Even if commuters don’t travel in circles, the variation
that is transmitted can build up along links. So to prevent this, we impose a
hierarchy on links.
Turning next to the economics of this assumption, it means that commuters
(or packets for the internet) must not be travelling on links that form circles.
17Also known as genus lynx.
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However, travel in opposite directions on links or routes is fine; in fact, this
is common for the internet application. For example, if there is a central
business district, then one way to satisfy the assumption is to have commuters
from each suburb travel towards it during morning rush hour and away from it
in the evenings. Circular roads or links forming a circle are also fine, as long
as the circle is not completed by overlapping commuters. In the context of
the internet, the assumption provides a warning concerning the potential build
up of total variation in circles on the internet, even if no set of packets travels
in a circle, due to the transmission of total variation across cohorts that travel
the same link at the same time.
All of our examples (including directed trees of various sorts used in section
3.2) satisfy this assumption.
Turning next to analysis of the system, there are two immediate, use-
ful consequences of bounding the commuting route length by  . First, the
set of routes that are possible for a commuter to choose, henceforth called
R, is finite. Second, we can examine bounds on our endogenous functionb(  ∆). Evidently, b(  ∆) ≥ 0. Now consider upper bounds.
An upper bound for departure density is Φ−1
³()
2
´
. But it is useful to have
a uniform bound on density beyond departure density. As we have seen, when
one cohort of commuters catches up with a slower cohort ahead of it, this co-
hort of commuters slows down by building up density so it is the same as that
of the slower cohort. Thus, this does not change the upper bound on density.
Where density can build up is at nodes, where cohorts can combine. It is
important to note also that boundary conditions at the origin of any route are
stated in terms of volume (cars per hour) rather than density (cars per mile).
Thus, an upper bound on endogenous density is given by the maximal density:
 =  ·maxΦ−1
³()
2
´
.
Definition: Let  be an upper bound on the time it will take until the last
commuter reaches the end of their route:
 =  + · max∈N , 6=
"
()
 ¡ ()¢
#
This time will be finite as long as   0.
At this point, there is an important but technical issue that must be ad-
dressed. We shall use Schauder’s theorem18 to show that for any choice of
18See Smart (1974).
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strategies by commuters, namely the choice of route and departure time for
each, the flow on each link of commuters in space and time as well as total
commuting time are well-defined, namely such a flow exists and is unique.
This requires some continuity of commuting times in initial conditions on a
link. Moreover, we employ Schmeidler’s theorem to prove existence of Nash
equilibrium for the dynamic commuting game. One of the requirements of
Schmeidler’s results is that utility is continuous (in the weak topology on 1)
in the strategy profile of all commuters. For the dynamic model as stated,
there is an important type of discontinuity that must be addressed.
The discontinuity is related to moving thresholds. In particular, if a thresh-
old moves backward through a node, a discontinuity in commuting times and
payoﬀs can result. Consider the following example:
%
=⇒ ·
&
Traﬃc moves from left to right, through a node represented by ·. After passing
through the node, some traﬃc heads up and to the right, whereas other traﬃc
heads down and to the right. Suppose that after passing through the node,
traﬃc heading down and to the right flows at high speed, and this traﬃc
volume is steady. Suppose further that a large, slow cohort passes through
the node and heads up and to the right, but is followed along the same route
by a faster cohort that catches up to the slower one along the upper right link,
after the node. Thus, a threshold is formed and the faster cohort slows down
to match the speed and density of the slower one. If the volume of this faster
cohort is so large that the threshold backs up along the upper right link and
through the node to the left link, we claim that a discontinuity in the speed
and payoﬀs of traﬃc heading down and to the right can occur. The speed
of the steady traﬃc heading down and to the right is reduced to the speed of
traﬃc at the threshold, thus increasing in a discrete manner its density and
the time needed to travel the link down and to the right. This can happen
despite the fact that much of the traﬃc on the first link proceeds up and to
the right, because the density of traﬃc using the lower link jumps up when
the threshold reaches the left link.
A suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition to prevent this type of disconti-
nuity would be one that prevents thresholds from moving backwards, whether
through a link or not. Thus, we assume:
Assumption 3: Φ() is a non-decreasing function of  .
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This assumption prevents thresholds from moving backwards, because it
says that the volume of consumers moving past a given point will not decrease
if density goes up. The direction of movement of thresholds is governed by
local volume (cars per unit time), not by local density (cars per unit distance).
With this additional assumption (to address the discontinuity), commuting
times and payoﬀ functions will be shown to be continuous in strategies.19
For our examples, note that Φ() = min { } satisfies this assump-
tion.
Unlike the entire extant literature, we state origin departure boundary
conditions (cars entering a link per hour) in terms of volume rather than
density (cars per mile). This is a very important distinction. A strategy
profile of commuters determines initial volume, namely departures per hour,
and not departure density, unless density is completely determined by volume;
see Example 4. In general, both departure volume and departure density must
be specified in Nash equilibrium.
Definitions: Let
Ω ≡
n
(b  ) ∈ £0 ¤2 |  ≥ bo (6)
D ≡ © : Ω→ [0 ()] measurable | for (b  )  ¡b 0  0¢ ∈ Ω: (b b) = 0,¯¯ (b  )−  ¡b 0  0¢¯¯ ≤ (0) · ¡¯¯b − b 0¯¯+ | −  0|¢ª
D ≡
Y
=1, 6=
D
We use square block metric for the Lipschitz condition as a matter of con-
venience.
The following definition comes from Strub and Bayen (2006), adapted to
our context. Interpretations immediately follow the definitions. For further
discussion, see also Bressan (2000).
Definition: A collection of measurable functions
nb( · ·)bo=1, 6=,
where b( · ·) : [0 ] × [0 ()] → [0  ] and b ∈ D, is called
19We conjecture that it would be possible to allow such discontinuities and omit Assump-
tion 3 using the following technique. Strub and Bayen (2006) allow a boundary condition
at the end of a link as well as the beginning of a link, and this can combined with Khan’s
(1989) generalization of Schmeidler (1973) to upper semicontinuous payoﬀ functions to ob-
tain existence of Nash equilibrium. However, as Strub and Bayen (2006, section 2) note,
boundary conditions on both ends of a link can cause inconsistencies in the flow on a link,
and the possibility of no solution. That is why they use a weak formulation of boundary
conditions that allows violation of such boundary conditions under certain circumstances.
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a solution to the conservation law (3) with initial and boundary conditions
if, for every  and  ( 6= ), for every  ∈ R, for every 1 function
 : [0 ] → R+, for every 1 function  : [0 ] × [0 ()] → R+, the
following hold:
0 ≤
Z ()
0
Z 
0
¯¯¯ b(  0 0)− ¯¯¯ · ( 0 0) (7)
+
³ b(  0 0)− ´ · hΦ ³ b(  0 0)´−Φ()i · ( 0 0)  00
and there exist 2( − 1)2 sets of Lebesgue measure zero: 0 ⊆ [0 ()],
 ⊆ [0 ], such that for all  = 1   ,  6= ,
lim
→0,  ∈0
Z ()
0
¯¯¯ b(   0)¯¯¯ 0 = 0
lim
→0, ∈
Z 
0

³ b(  0 ) ( 0)´( 0) 0 = 0
where
 ( ) ≡ sup
∈()
((− ) · [Φ()−Φ()])
 ( ) ≡ [inf( ) sup( )]
b(b  ) = Z 


³
(  b(b  )) ´ 
() ≡ 
¡© ∈  | ∃0 ∈  with (0) = () = ,  (0) =  , (0) = ()ª¢
() ≡ Φ−1
Ã({ ∈  | 1(()) = , 2(()) = , ¯¯()−  ¯¯  })
2
!
+ (8)
X
0=1, 0 6=
P
{∈R|for some  −1()=0, ()=, +1()=} ()P
{∈R|for some  −1()=0, ()=} ()
· b(0   (0))
Remark 1: The crucial but subtle connection between the functions b andb is through the last boundary condition and definition (2). The last condition
gives entry into a link by those just departing from their origin node and those
continuing their travel through the node from other links.
Remark 2: What we call a solution is actually a refinement of other solution
concepts used in the literature that are more obviously related to (3). The
least restrictive of these is the concept of distributional solution, followed by the
more restrictive weak solution. The (yet more restrictive) solution concept we
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use is generally called an entropy weak solution in the literature. Motivation
for using this solution is that although we have existence theorems for all of
these solution concepts, uniqueness holds only for the entropy weak solution.
There is also intuition for the refinement in terms of stability, usually called
admissibility conditions, in the literature we have cited.
Remark 3: It is important to provide at least a heuristic explanation,
part of the folklore in the literature, about why this represents a solution
to the partial diﬀerential equation or conservation law (3), since there is no
obvious connection between the partial diﬀerential equation and what we call a
solution.20 Suppose that  can be chosen so that  is close to an indicator
function for some set in [0 ] × [0 ()] and  is close to an indicator
function for that same set multiplied by 1( ()) , so that we can focus
on the integrand in inequality (7). If we can choose another function so
that these derivatives are close to −1 multiplied by these functions,21 then
inequality (7) implies: ¯¯¯ b(   )− ¯¯¯+

³ b(   )− ´ · hΦ ³ b(   )´−Φ()i · 1 ³ b(   ) ´ = 0
Dividing by 
³ b(   )− ´, we obtain³ b(   )− ´+hΦ ³b(   )´−Φ()i· 1 ³ b(   ) ´ = 0
Now choose  = b(  − 1  ) for  = 1 2 3  Then dividing by 1 and
taking limits as →∞ yields
 b(   )
 + Φ
0
³ b(   )´ · 1

³ b(   ) ´ = 0
This expression is the same as (3).
Theorem 1: Suppose that  satisfies Assumption 1 and that feasible routes
are restricted to satisfy Assumption 2. Suppose further that flux Φ is strictly
20Evidently, this is one of the barriers to entering this literature.
21Notice that these restrictions are on the derivatives of  rather than on  itself, so
it is possible to make the derivatives negative while satisfying the non-negativity constraint
on .
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increasing in density  . Then to each dynamic commuting route structure
(  ), there corresponds a unique solution
nb( · ·)bo=1, 6=.
Remark 4: The case where Φ is weakly increasing, as in the examples,
will be dealt with when existence of equilibrium is considered. For technical
reasons, it is easiest to consider this case as a limit of the cases where Φ is
strictly increasing.
Remark 5: One issue concerning our system is how we define a solution.
Our system in  is generally rather discontinuous, so it requires special treat-
ment. There are alternatives to the technique we use, which we consider to
be the most straightforward given our framework. One such alternative is
to assume that the flux function Φ is smooth and either strictly convex or
strictly concave. The conservation law is then called strictly hyperbolic; see
Bressan (2000), particularly section 10.2. We can then define a Filippov so-
lution (Filippov, 1973) to this problem, that was introduced into economics
by Ito (1979).22 Colombo and Marson (2003) and particularly Marson (2004)
can be applied to obtain existence and uniqueness of a solution.23 However,
we do not place further restrictions on the flux.
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the Appendix. Formally, we prove
that for given departure times and route choices the system behavior given byn³b( · ·)b(· ·)´o=1 exists and is uniquely defined. To accomplish
this, we apply Schauder’s theorem in a slightly unorthodox manner to the set
of boundary conditions for each node, where the boundary conditions lie in
the space of functions of bounded variation with respect to time.
Next we examine existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in our
dynamic model.
The time cost of a dynamic commuting structure (  ) for commuter 
is
R 
−
 ()()−(()+)
2 ·({0∈|1(())=1((0)), 2(())=2((0)), ()=(0)}) . In essence, this
is the expected time cost taken over all commuters using the same pure depar-
ture (time and first road) strategy. These are the commuters that determine
departure volume of a cohort with commuter  on the link.
22Formally speaking, we could introduce the general definition of a Filippov solution and
then show that there exists one with finite total variation, but here we follow Columbo and
Marson (2003) and Marson (2004) who skip this step because this fact is already well-known.
23In fact, Strub and Bayen (2006) use a strictly concave flux function in their application
in section 5 to the I-210 in Los Angeles. Thus, they could have used a Filippov solution
instead of a weak entropy solution.
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We fix an arrival time at  ∈ [0∞]. Next we introduce the arrival
penalty function  : R+ → R+. To give intuition, think of  =  ()(). The
arrival penalty is given by
 () ≥ 0 where  () = 0
For example, in the introduction we required that:
Almost surely for  ∈ , b ()() ≤ 
Thus,  () = 0 for  ≤  whereas  () = ∞ for   . It is actually
more common in the literature to use an asymmetric linear penalty function;
see Arnott et al (1993). We can allow further generalization, for example
heterogeneous required arrival times , but at the cost of messier notation.
We note that in the framework with a finite number of departure times, this is
actually the expected penalty for the given choice of strategy, since commuters
are randomly assigned over a small departure time interval.
The individual payoﬀ function for the dynamic model is thus:
(;   ) ≡ (9)
−
Z 
−
b ()(  0)− (() +  0) +  (b ()(  0))
2 · ({0 ∈  | 1(()) = 1((0)), 2(()) = 2((0)), () = (0)})
0
The utilitarian welfare function for the dynamic model is
(  ) =
−
Z

Z 
−
[b ()(  0)− (() +  0) +  (b ()(  0))]
2 · ({0 ∈  | 1(()) = 1((0)), 2(()) = 2((0)), () = (0)})
0()
A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the dynamic model is a dynamic
commuting structure (  ) such that almost surely for  ∈ , there is no
route  of length  ≤  and departure time 0 for commuter  such that,
computing arrival times b 0 as in Theorem 1 for the new route and departure
time,Z 
−
b ()(  0)− (() +  0) +  (b ()(  0))
2 · ({0 ∈  | 1(()) = 1((0)), 2(()) = 2((0)), () = (0)})
0 Z 
−
b 0(  0)− (0 +  0) +  (b 0(  0))
2 · ({0 ∈  | 1(()) = 1((0)), 2(()) = 2((0)), () = (0)})
0
We note that due to the congestion externality, the Nash equilibria are
unlikely to be Pareto (or utilitarian) optimal. Example 2 below will make this
precise.
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Next, in Theorem 2, we shall prove existence of Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies for our model with discrete and finite departure times by applying
Schmeidler (1973, Theorems 1 and 2). For the model with a continuum of
departure time strategies, we can only obtain existence of -equilibrium in pure
strategies. It is also worth noting that since Φ will not be required to be
strictly increasing, we must modify (8) to:
() ∈ Φ−1
Ã({ ∈  | 1(()) = , 2(()) = , ¯¯()−  ¯¯  })
2
!
+
X
0=1, 0 6=
P
{∈R|for some  −1()=0, ()=, +1()=} ()P
{∈R|for some  −1()=0, ()=} ()
· b(0   (0))
This adds another layer of indeterminacy to Nash equilibrium in the case where
Φ is not strictly increasing. Consider, for example, ( ) = 1 , and thus
Φ() = 1. Then any departure density with respect to distance can be
made consistent with the initial volume conditions at the origin node.
Theorem 2: Under Assumptions 1-3, if the penalty function  is continu-
ous,24 there exists a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
One can prove that a utilitarian optimum exists for the discrete departure
time model. Instead of looking at a continuum of individual strategies, give the
social planner the control variables that are the measure of commuters using
each route at each departure time. The control vector is finite-dimensional.
Assume, to begin, that Φ is strictly increasing in  . With assumptions
1-2 and Theorem 1, flows and utility levels are well-defined for each departure
and route strategy profile. In the proof of Theorem 2, found in Appendix
2, it is shown that destination arrival times are continuous in the departure
and route strategy profile. Thus, the utilitarian objective is continuous as a
function of the measure of commuters using each route and departure time, so
an optimum exists.
Consider next the case where Φ is non-decreasing in  . As usual, take
a sequence of initial conditions converging to the supremum. These initial
conditions are in terms of volumes and routes, but there exists associated
departure densities (per mile instead of per minute) associated with these
volumes such that the supremum is approached. In the proof of Theorem 1,
the only use made of Φ strictly increasing in  is to prove that b is unique, so
24Although some of our examples, such as the one in the introduction, feature a discon-
tinuous  , a nearby continuous  with suﬃciently steep slope just after the arrival time
would work just as well, but would distract from the point of the example.
30
there is an associated sequence of flows such that the optimum is approached.
Following the remainder of the proof of Theorem 2 (that proves continuity
of the objective in the strategy profile), the optimum will be achieved in the
limit.
Example 2: What does Nash Equilibrium look like in the case of a linear
penalty function? This is important for applications, as much of the literature
uses such a specification. It is actually quite interesting. Suppose that
 () =
(
( − ) if  ≥ 
( − ) if  ≥ 
where ,   0. To fix ideas, we consider the example from the introduction,
with one link and two nodes, modified for this penalty function. Capacity of
the link is  = 1, whereas travel time on the uncongested link is 1. At a Nash
equilibrium, utility must be equalized across commuters, for otherwise everyone
will imitate the happiest ones only. Fortunately for urban economists, this
is a familiar condition. There is mass 2 of identical commuters. Consider
an example with 2 departure times, 1
2
and 3
2
. Those who choose departure
time 1
2
actually leave at a random time distributed uniformly between 0 and
1, whereas those who choose departure time 3
2
actually leave at a random time
distributed uniformly between 1 and 2. Let  = 7
2
and  =  ≤ 1
2
. It will
turn out that in Nash equilibrium, the commuters who choose departure time
1
2
travel at the speed limit, whereas the commuters who leave at time 3
2
travel
slower and arrive later. Suppose the (endogenous) measure of commuters
who choose departure time 1
2
is called , whereas the (endogenous) measure of
commuters who leave at time 3
2
is called 0, where +0 = 2. For those who
choose departure time 1
2
, their travel time is 1 whereas their expected early
arrival penalty is 2. For those departing at time 3
2
, their travel time is 0
whereas their expected early arrival penalty is  · (7
2
− (0+ 3
2
)). Setting these
negative utilities equal to each other, we obtain 0 = 1
1− , and thus  = 1−21− .
Notice that, similar to Example 1, we can create a Pareto improvement by
making more agents choose departure time 1
2
. This disrupts the equal utility
condition.
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3 Applications
3.1 Can the Static Equilibrium be Supported by a Dy-
namic Equilibrium?25
Here we ask the following question. Given identical exogenous data for the
static and dynamic commuting games and finding Nash equilibrium, are the
flows in the static and dynamic models the same? In other words, is the static
model a reduced form of the dynamic model? This is important for addressing
the issue of whether the static model makes sense. For if the answer to this
question is negative, then there should be no interest in the static model, since
its equilibrium behavior is diﬀerent from the analogous dynamic model, and
the real world is dynamic.
For simplicity, we return now to the examples used in many of the previous
sections, namely where there is no penalty for early arrival and an infinite
penalty for late arrival. One could imagine that the static model represents
some sort of steady state of the dynamic model, where commuters are intro-
duced at constant flows at all the nodes, and the flows in the links are constant
over time. But there are two problems with this idea. First, with a fixed ar-
rival time (say 9 AM), a steady state does not make sense. The time profile of
equilibrium departures will generally not be constant over time, since everyone
must get to work by the arrival time. Even if arrival time varied by commuter,
one would not expect to see a steady state necessarily attained. Second, the
two alternative concepts for consistency of the two models we introduce next
are weaker than asking that a steady state of the dynamic model look like a
static equilibrium. In other words, if a steady state of the dynamic model
looked like the static model, then the conditions would be satisfied. But they
are not.
One could ask whether average flows (over time and space or distance
on a link) in the dynamic model are equilibrium flows of the static model.
Given identical exogenous data for the static and dynamic games and finding
25The ideas in this subsection owe much to Anas (2007) and to discussions with Alex
Anas.
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equilibrium, does the following condition on flows hold?26
() =
R ()
0
R 
0
b(  ∆)∆
() ·  for all  = 1 2  
But this disguises the following issue. In the dynamic model, flows could be
high for a time and then zero. The average over the link and over time would
be in between, but there would be no actual time and distance on the link
where the average was actually attained. So it is logical to ask whether there
is a time  , and a distance on every link ∆(), such that the flows from the
static model are attained by the dynamic model:27
() = b(  ∆()) for all  = 1 2  
To answer all of these questions in the negative, one only need go back
to the simple example with two nodes and one link given in the introduction.
There the uncongested commuting pattern Nash equilibrium is not present
for the static model, though the congested one is. But if we want to say
something more, for example that there is no equilibrium of the dynamic
model that replicates the behavior of the static model, then we must become
slightly more sophisticated.
Example 3: We set up a network with 3 identical links in series, each one
with the structure of the simple example in the introduction (equivalently, one
could use 2 nodes and 1 link with the travel time multiplied by 3). Then if we
set the arrival time at 1 + 3 (where   1), the congested commuting pattern
violates the arrival time for the last commuters, the commuters departing at
time 1 (they arrive at 3+1), and the uncongested commuting pattern remains
as the only equilibrium of the dynamic model. It violates all of the conditions
above, as there is no uncongested commuting pattern for the static model.
In fact, even if we only pay attention to distances on links where there are
commuters, their density is   1, never to be found in an equilibrium of the
static model. In summary, for this example, the only equilibrium of the static
model is the congested commuting pattern, whereas the only equilibrium of the
26In a steady state of the dynamic model, this condition would be satisfied because the
flow on each link would be constant, independent of time, and thus be equal to the average
flow.
27In a steady state of the dynamic model, this condition would be satisfied because the
flow on each link would be constant, independent of time, so it would be satisfied for every
time.
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dynamic model is the uncongested commuting pattern. Thus, the equilibrium
sets of the two models are unrelated.28
Verhoef (1999) studies a similar problem in a very diﬀerent class of models,
and concludes (p. 365) that, “For static models of peak demand, it was argued
that for such models to be dynamically consistent, rather heroic assumptions
on the pattern of scheduling costs have to be made.”
3.2 Welfare Properties of Nash Equilibrium
Equilibrium selection is an important issue in one shot congestion games with
Pigouvian congestion taxes. Under such taxes, there can be multiple Nash
equilibria, only some of which are eﬃcient.29 As remarked in the introduction,
Sandholm (2007) shows that with a finite number of commuters, an evolution-
ary process, and Pigouvian taxes, the outcome will be eﬃcient. A major
limitation of this work is the assumption of a common utility function with
idiosyncratic perturbations, which seems to rule out heterogeneous origins and
destinations.
Although that approach is clearly interesting, we take a completely diﬀer-
ent approach here, motivated by our examples. A major advantage of our
approach is that we can compare non-trivial commutes (home to work) with
their reverses (work to home), to our knowledge absent in the literature. As
we wish to focus on departure times rather than routes in the dynamic model,
we impose the following restriction:
Definitions: A outbound tree network is a set of route lengths and
routes R such that for any ( ) (0 0) ∈ R, there do not exist 1   ≤  and
1  0 ≤ 0 with −1() 6= 0−1(0) and () = 0(0). An inbound tree
network is a set of route lengths and routes R such that for any ( ) (0 0) ∈
R, there do not exist 1 ≤    and 1 ≤ 0  0 with () = 0(0) and
+1() 6= 0+1(0).
In terms of commuting, an inbound tree network might be a reasonable
model of commuting from home to work, whereas an outbound tree network
28Without an arrival time, it’s easy to argue that neither the static nor the dynamic model
is a reasonable model of the morning commute.
29We do not provide an example here, both because they are available in the literature
(for more macro models) and because, as will be apparent from Theorem 3, examples in our
framework with non-constant (or non-zero) Pigouvian taxes will have relatively complicated
route structures. For instance, a one link example won’t work.
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might be a reasonable model of commuting from work to home. In terms
of electronic networks, this might not be a good model of the internet, but
tree structures are often used in local area networks. The property of interest
for an outbound tree network is preventing mergers of routes at nodes where
traﬃc continues together along the next link.
You might wonder why we are introducing a restrictive condition like this.
It is one way to sort out the eﬃciency properties of Nash equilibrium in our
dynamic model. What is perhaps strange but interesting is that on a two
way network, commuting to work may be ineﬃcient, whereas commuting to
home might be eﬃcient. In other words, reversing the commute on a directed
network can change the eﬃciency properties of Nash equilibrium.
We begin our discussion with the static model. With an inbound or out-
bound tree network, there are no choices to be made, so rather trivially there is
an eﬃcient Nash equilibrium. We conjecture that this result can be extended
to more general structures than trees30, but that would distract from the main
point of this section.
Next we turn to the dynamic model. In particular, we wish to examine
the similarities and diﬀerences between commuting from home to work and
commuting from work to home. Since networks are arbitrary in our general
framework, we focus on trees, and begin our analysis with an example. Most
of the intuition can be gleaned from this example. What is important for our
purposes is asymmetry.
Example 4: First, consider the commute from two home locations  and
 on the right to a common work location  on the left, via a merge at node
:
· 
.
· ⇐= ·
  -
· 
Suppose that rush hour is from time 0 to time 1 with two possible depar-
ture times: 14 and 34, where commuters choosing the first departure time
are uniformly distributed over actual departure times [0 12] and commuters
choosing the second departure time are uniformly distributed over actual de-
parture times [12 1]. The length of each link is 1. Speed on links between
nodes  and , as well as between nodes  and , is given by min
n
1
  1
o
.
30E.g. shrubberies, with leaves at the ends of branches.
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Speed on the link between nodes  and  is given by min
n
2
  2
o
. There is
no arrival time penalty; it’s not very natural when comparing a commute and
its reverse, though the examples and theorem can likely be extended in this
direction. There is measure 1 commuters travelling from node  to node ,
whereas there is measure 1 travelling from node  to node .
It is obvious that many departure densities will be consistent with the
departure volume, and that departure volume must be 1. Thus, strategy
profiles will focus on departure density rather than volume.
Let’s first examine Nash equilibrium. Consider the symmetric strategy
profile where measure 12 commuters at home  choose departure time 14
and thus are uniformly distributed with flux volume 1 over [0 12], whereas
measure 12 commuters at home  choose departure time 34 and thus are
uniformly distributed with flux volume 1 over [12 1]. As always, we must
be careful about how volume (cars per hour) translates into density (cars per
mile), particularly at origins. In this case, we set density  = 2, so speed is 12.
Similarly, commuters at home  are split: measure 12 choose departure time
14 and are uniformly distributed over [0 12] with flux volume 1, whereas
measure 12 choose departure time 34 and are uniformly distributed over
[12 1] with flux volume 1. Each commuter experiences a total travel time of
4: travel time is 2 on the initial link, and 2 on the link between node  and
node .
Next consider the following slightly asymmetric strategy profile that will
not be a Nash equilibrium. The departure volumes are the same as for the
Nash equilibrium profile, but the departure densities will be diﬀerent. The
density schedule for commuters who have homes at  remain the same as
above. Commuters who live at  will have the following departure schedule.
For those who depart at time 14, the departure density is 15, so initial speed
is 1
15 . For those who depart at time 34, the departure density is 25. The
first cohort to arrive at node  will be those from homes at node  who
depart in [0 12], and who arrive at node  at times in the interval [15 2].
Next are the commuters from homes at node  who depart in [0 12], and
who arrive at node  at times in the interval [2 25]. The next commuters
to arrive are the commuters from node  who depart in the interval [12 1]
and who arrive at node  at times in the interval [25 3]. Finally, the cohort
of commuters who depart node  in [12 1] arrive at node  at times in
the interval [3 35]. Notice that the overlap in arrival times at node  is of
measure zero. Therefore, in the end, travel time for all commuters who live at
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node  is 3, whereas travel time for the first cohort from node  is 3
2
+ 4
3
= 17
6
,
but for the second cohort is 5
2
+ 4
5
= 33
10
. Clearly, this strategy profile Pareto
dominates the Nash equilibrium strategy profile, but is not a Nash equilibrium
itself.
Next we reverse the commute. The structure of permissible departure
times and speed as a function of density are the same. The new diagram is
as follows:
· 
%
· =⇒ ·
  &
· 
A Nash equilibrium and utilitarian optimal strategy profile has measure 12 of
each type departing work at each of the two departure times. The departure
density is 2, whereas initial speed is 1. The total travel time of each commuter
is 2.
Theorem 3: With an outward bound tree network, assuming   0 and
 = 0, there is a Pareto optimal31 strategy profile that is also a Nash equilib-
rium. Thus, there exists an eﬃcient Nash equilibrium.
Thus, under these additional assumptions, eﬃciency can be achieved not
through taxes, but by equilibrium selection. Prisoners’ dilemma problems are
ruled out by the structure of the game, specifically these additional assump-
tions. Example 4 is an example of an inward bound tree network that has
no eﬃcient Nash equilibrium, so an analog of Theorem 3 for an inward bound
tree network is impossible.
Since the simple example with two nodes and one link from the introduction
is trivially an outward bound tree network, it cannot be true that all Nash
equilibria are eﬃcient.
4 Conclusions
We have asked and answered several questions about commuting using two
models, one static and one dynamic. For each model, we have shown that a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists for the one shot game, that a Pareto
31Although we have not defined it formally, Pareto optimum is the usual concept in our
context of a continuum of agents.
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optimum exists, and that Nash equilibrium is generally not Pareto optimal.
Beyond that, we have shown that all Nash equilibria of the static model can
look very diﬀerent from any Nash equilibrium of the dynamic model. Since
the static model features behavior unlike the dynamic one, we reject the former
as a reduced form of the latter and stick with the dynamic model. Finally,
we have examined the welfare properties of Nash equilibrium in the particular
case of a tree network, and found that equilibrium might not be eﬃcient for
the morning commute, but there always is an eﬃcient Nash equilibrium for
the evening commute. Thus, congestion pricing is more important for the
morning commute, whereas equilibrium selection is more important for the
evening commute. Further eﬀort should be devoted to the welfare properties
of Nash equilibrium on specific directed networks. In sum, what we have
shown is that a model of congestion using microfounded behavior has very
diﬀerent properties from the reduced form models used in the literature.
Our commuting model can be reinterpreted as a model of internet conges-
tion. In this context, local area networks often have a tree structure, so for
example the results on eﬃciency of Nash equilibrium and the consequences for
congestion tolls can be interpreted in this framework.
For simple examples, the Nash equilibria of our model can be solved ana-
lytically. For more complex examples, the proof of Theorem 1 indicates that
a numerical solution technique involves nesting the solution of a discontinuous
system of diﬀerential equations inside a fixed point solution algorithm.
In a companion paper to this research, Berliant (2012) examines the set
of Nash equilibria in the infinitely repeated versions of both the static and
dynamic commuting games, and the folk theorem is used to obtain these large
sets. There we present some preliminary evidence from the shutdown of an
expressway in St. Louis that commuters do not always play one shot Nash
equilibrium. We also discuss the application of the anti-folk theorem to our
specific game, namely conditions under which the Nash equilibria of the infi-
nitely repeated game are the Nash equilibria of the one shot game.
Our model could be extended to allow elastic demand for travel to or from
work. The extension of the model to allow land markets and endogenous
choice of household residence and job location would also be interesting.
The dynamic model should be applied to real world commuting. Since it
can accommodate an arbitrary (exogenous) route structure, it has both pos-
itive and normative content, especially regarding Pareto improvements. For
example, it can be used to perform cost benefit analysis with respect to chang-
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ing infrastructure and mass transit.
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5 Appendix: Proofs
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Preliminaries: We work to find a unique fixed point in initial conditions 
and progress along a link . The main issue is consistency of the commuting
pattern with boundary values on links, namely the density of departures along
a link from a node. These initial conditions are partly exogenous, due to the
fixed choice of departure times and routes for Theorem 1 (in contrast with
Theorem 2), and partly endogenous, for nodes along a commuter’s route that
are not the point of departure. So we employ a fixed point on this data; it
will be in a subspace of functions of bounded variation for .
We have already defined the space where  lives; see (6). Recalling that
each permissible route can only go through a given node once, next we define
the space of all possible initial conditions, G:
Definitions: For  : [0 ]→ R+, the total variation norm is defined as:
 () ≡ sup
( X
=1
|()− (−1)| ¯¯ ≥ 1,  ∈ [0 ], 0  1  · · ·  )
Next, define
 ≡ min
(
Φ−1
Ã({ ∈  | ()) = , ¯¯()−  ¯¯  })
2
!
¯¯¯
 ∈ R  ∈ [0 ] 1(()) =  2(()) =  ({ ∈  | ()) = , ¯¯()−  ¯¯  })  0 o
 0
Number the equivalence classes of links defined by the relation º, from the
bottom class up, using the index  = 1 2  ≤ 2 −  . Define 1 ≡
( + 1) ·  and define inductively
+1 ≡ |R| · ( + 1) ·  + ( − 1) ·  · 
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for  = 1 2   − 1. For link , define () as the equivalence class to
which it is assigned. Finally, define:
G ≡
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
½
Φ−1
µ
({∈|()=, |()−|})
2
¶¾
if 1() = , 2() = ;n
(·) measurable on [0 ] | 0 ≤ (·) ≤  , () = 0,  ((·)) ≤ ()
o
if () = , +1() =  for some   1
Notice that for Theorem 1, flux Φ is one to one.
G ≡
Y
=1
Y
{∈R|()= for some }
G
We shall be searching for a fixed point in G. So the next step is to define
the map from G into itself.
We begin by fixing some  ∈ G, so that for each link ,  6= , define
( ·) ≡ X
{∈R|()=, +1()= for some ≥1}
(·)
Define
 ≡ ( − 1) · ()
Notice that  (( ·)) ≤ . After some preparation, we shall define
the map T : G → G. We will call T () ≡ b. Next we begin preparations for
defining this map.
Given the initial condition
( 0∆) = 0 ∀ ∆ ≥ 0
and the left boundary condition on each link ,  6= : (   0) =
( ), Strub and Bayen (2006) yields existence of a unique solution (as
we have defined it) called (  ∆). We must be a little careful here,
specifically at the right boundary (). Although they only use the solution
on (0 )×(0 ()), as they remark, it is in fact defined on [0 ]×[0 ()].
All we need is that it is defined on (0 ) × (0 ()]. Second, to make
the right boundary condition non-binding, we simply set (in their notation)
() = 0. Then the right boundary condition becomes vacuous.32 The initial
32In fact, this is where we use Assumption 3, implying that there is no backup onto a link
of traﬃc congestion, namely a threshold, at the endpoint of that link. In particular, we
ignore behavior outside the link when we solve the diﬀerential equation for traﬃc flow on a
link.
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(in contrast with the boundary) condition is: at time 0, the density of traﬃc
along the link is 0. Only the left boundary condition will apply in a significant
way.
Next we define a unique (b  ) ∈ D associated with  . To accomplish
this, we shall apply Bressan (1988) Theorem 1 to the (discontinuous) ordinary
diﬀerential equation:
(b  )
 =  ((   (b  )) ) (10)
This will require us to delve a little into the clever proof of existence of a
solution  used by Strub and Bayen (2006)33 in order to integrate it with the
structure of Bressan (1988).34 These ideas will also be useful shortly in order
to prove that b ∈ G.
There are two (suﬃcient) conditions for the existence and uniqueness of
a solution to the diﬀerential equation (10). The first is locally bounded Γ
variation, when specialized to our context is as follows. Let ≺∗ be the partial
order on R2:
(∆) ≺∗ (0∆0) if and only if |∆0 −∆| ≤ · (0 − )
A vector field  : R2 → R is said to have locally bounded Γ variation35 if,
for every (0 0) ∈ R2, there exist    0 such that:
X
=1
| (∆)−  (−1∆−1)| ≤ 
for every finite sequence (∆) ( = 1  ) with
(0∆0) ≺ ∗(1∆1) · ·· ≺∗ ( ∆)
  0 + 
The second condition is:
| (∆)| ≤    for all (∆)
For our application, take  to be the smallest integer larger thanmax () .
Then  =  and  =  · max ( ). We also know from Strub and
33The keys to this proof are the Godunov construction and the Courant-Friedrichs-Lewy
condition.
34Since there are notational conflicts between the two papers as well as with our notation,
integration requires some notational changes.
35It is quite amazing to an outsider that this definition seems not to have been related to
the standard definition of bounded variation on R2 that relies on calculus.
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Bayen (2006), p. 560, that for each∆ ∈ [0 ()], b( ·∆) is of bounded
variation. But for our purposes, it will be useful to prove the stronger asser-
tion: For each ∆ ∈ [0 ()],
 ( b( ·∆)) ≤ 
That is next on the agenda.
Strub and Bayen (2006) use an approximation to construct the solution that
we call b( · ·). In their notation, they consider only one link and thus
drop  and . To reduce notation, we also drop these indexes temporarily.
The discrete approximation they use is called  , where  denotes a time cell
and  denotes a location cell, and where  and  are integers. Specifically, the
cells are defined as follows:
 =
∙ 
M ·
µ
− 1
2
¶
 M ·
µ
+ 1
2
¶¸
 =
∙ 
M ·
µ
− 1
2
¶
 M ·
µ
+ 1
2
¶¸
where  is the length of the link, M denotes the number of location cells
( = 1 M) and the constant   0. The cell sizes tend to zero (M→∞) as
the approximation converges. It is important to note that, from the uniqueness
result, the limit is actually independent of . The key equation system from
Strub and Bayen (2006, p. 559) is as follows:
⎧
⎨
⎩
+1
2
is an element  of (  +1) such that (+1 −  ) · Φ() is minimal
+1 =  −  ·
³
Φ(+1
2
)−Φ(− 1
2
)
´
Our assumptions about the flux function Φ allow us to simplify this. Let 
be the Lipschitz constant for Φ. Then¯¯+1 −  ¯¯ =  · ¯¯¯Φ(+1
2
)−Φ(− 1
2
)
¯¯¯
≤  ·  ·
¯¯¯
+ 1
2
− − 1
2
¯¯¯
=  ·  · ¯¯ − −1¯¯
Choosing  ≤ 1 , we obtain:¯¯+1 −  ¯¯ ≤ ¯¯ − −1¯¯ (11)
Dropping  and , if () is the left boundary condition at time , the left
boundary condition for the discrete approximation is given by:
0 = M · 
Z

()
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To start, if we fix location  = 1 and sum (11) over time , we can see
that the total variation at location cell 1 is bounded by the total variation
of 0 over time , that is in turn at most the constant . By induction
on , we can see that this holds for each . Finally, from Strub and Bayen
(2006), these step functions  converge strongly (in 1) to the function b of
bounded variation. In our context, for each fixed , we can apply Helly’s
theorem to obtain pointwise convergence of a subsequence, implying that the
limit b satisfies  ( b( ·∆)) ≤ . To obtain the exit density, we take
a sequence {∆}∞=1 with ∆  () and lim→∞∆ = (). Then
again apply Helly’s theorem to obtain the pointwise limit of a subsequence,
and call this density b( · ()).
This exit density (as a function of time) will form the basis for entry density
on succeeding links. Notice that b( · ()) is of bounded variation.
By remark 2.1 of Bressan (2000), we can take it to be right continuous in .
Next, we examine whether this limit exit density is unique, at least among
functions of bounded variation that satisfy  (( ·∆)) ≤ . Sup-
pose that there are two diﬀerent exit limits of bounded variation; call theme( · ()) and b( · ()). Now we already know from Strub
and Bayen (2006) that e( · ·) = b( · ·) a.s. (∆). The next ar-
gument parallels Strub and Bayen (pp. 558-559) where they argue that their
solution is unique. We also know for  ∈ 1 (0 ) and  ∈ 1 (0 ())
(where  ≥ 0),Z ()
0
Z 
0
¯¯¯ e( ∆)− b( ∆)¯¯¯(∆)0()
+ 
³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ · ³Φ³ e( ∆)´−Φ³b( ∆)´´ · 0(∆)()∆
≥ 0
For  approximating the indicator function of [0 ], we have:
lim sup
→0
Z ()
0
¯¯¯ e( ∆)− b( ∆)¯¯¯(∆)
− lim inf
→
Z ()
0
¯¯¯ e( ∆)− b( ∆)¯¯¯(∆)
≥ −
Z ()
0
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´− Φ³ b( ∆)´´ · 0(∆)∆
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Taking  to approximate the indicator function of [0 ()],
≥ lim sup
∆→()
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´−Φ³ b( ∆)´´ 
− lim inf∆→0
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´−Φ³ b( ∆)´´ 
In sum, we have:
lim sup
→0
Z ()
0
¯¯¯ e( ∆)− b( ∆)¯¯¯(∆)−
lim inf
→
Z ()
0
¯¯¯ e( ∆)− b( ∆)¯¯¯(∆)
≥ lim sup
∆→()
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´− Φ³ b( ∆)´´ 
− lim inf∆→0
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´− Φ³ b( ∆)´´ 
Since the left hand side (the first two terms) are zero, we obtain:
lim inf∆→0
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´−Φ³ b( ∆)´´ 
≥ lim sup
∆→()
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´−Φ³ b( ∆)´´ 
As in Strub and Bayen (2006, p. 558), the left hand side is 0. The right hand
side is non-negative (recall that flux Φ is non-decreasing in density). Hence,
lim sup
∆→()
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´·³Φ³ e( ∆)´−Φ³b( ∆)´´ 
= 0
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Now since Φ is strictly increasing in  , then we know that
lim sup
∆→()
°°°( ·∆)− b( ·∆)°°°1 = 0,
implying that e( · ()) = b( · ()) a.s. (). Both e( · ())
and b( · ()) are of bounded variation, so by Lemma 2.1 and Remark
2.1 of Bressan (2000), by taking right continuous versions, they are in fact
equal.
Although we used the argument just above to obtain a well-defined exit
density, if we replace () with an arbitrary distance ∆, 0  ∆  (),
the same argument applies and we have that for any sequence
©∆ª∞=1 with
lim→∞∆ = ∆, lim→∞ b( ·∆) = b( ·∆) a.s. (), where
 ( b( ·∆)) ≤ .
Taking the right continuous version, it follows that lim→∞ b( ·∆) =b( ·∆); for if not, then by Helly’s theorem there are at least two (point-
wise) limits and b( ·∆) is not well-defined, a contradiction.
Now fix (0∆0) and take  = 1 2 , and a finite sequence (∆) ( =
1  ) with
(0∆0) ≺ ∗(1∆1) · ·· ≺∗ ( ∆)
  0 + 1
In order to apply Bressan (1988), we must show that for any such sequence,
there exist  and  (that can depend on (0∆0)) such that:
X
=1
|(( ∆) )− (( −1∆−1) )| ≤  (12)
To ease notation and break the proof down a little, we first prove:
X
=1
|( ∆)− ( −1∆−1)| ≤ 0 (13)
Fix   0 and let  be so large that for all ,
 (( ·∆)− ( ·∆0))  
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With this in hand, since {( ·∆)}∞=1 is a Cauchy sequence in  :
X
=1
|( ∆)− ( −1∆−1)|
≤
X
=1
|( ∆)− ( −1∆)|+ |( −1∆)− ( −1∆−1)|
=
X
=1
|( ∆)− ( −1∆)|+
X
=1
|( −1∆)− ( −1∆−1)|
≤
X
=1
|( ∆)− ( −1∆)|+  (( ·∆)− ( ·∆−1))
≤  (( ·∆)) + 2
≤  + 2
So setting 0  , we have proved the intermediate step (13). To prove
(12) from this, we use the fact that  is Lipschitz with constant , so we set
 =  ·0. Thus, we have fulfilled the assumptions of Bressan (1988), Theorem
1, so there is a unique (forward) solution (b  ) to (10) for any given  .
Next, we apply the arguments elaborated above to define, and discover
properties of, the map T : G → G. Let ( · ·) be the unique solution
to the conservation law on link  with initial condition 0 and boundary
condition ( ·).
Let (b  ) be the corresponding (unique) solution to the diﬀerential
equation (10). Define:
b() = −1(· )(()) (14)
Notice that since speed   0, (b  ) is strictly decreasing in b , so b()
is well-defined.
With this preparation, we can define the image T () = b, that will depend
on both , through the solution on a link  as defined above, and , through
its inverse image b .
b() ≡
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(())
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 
0(()) · b(   ())
if ∃  ≥ 3 with −1() = , () = 
Φ−1
µ
({∈|())=, |()−|})
2
¶
if 1() = , 2() = 
(15)
The argument that b ∈ G is as follows.
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First, for the case 1() = , 2() = , by definition
 (b()) = 
Ã
Φ−1
Ã({ ∈  | 1(()) = , ¯¯()−  ¯¯  })
2
!!
≤ (+1)·
In all other cases,
 (b(·)) = 
Ã
(b())P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b()) · b(   ())
!
= sup
≥1, ∈[0], 01···
( X
=1
¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b()) · b(  ())
− 
(b(−1))P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b(−1)) · b( −1 ())
¯¯¯¯
¯
)
≤ sup
≥1, ∈[0], 01···
( X
=1
(b())P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())
·
¯¯¯ b(  ())− b( −1 ())¯¯¯ ¾
+ sup
≥1, ∈[0], 01···
( X
=1
¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())
− 
(b(−1))P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b(−1))
¯¯¯¯
¯ · b( −1 ())
)
≤  ( b( · ()))
+ sup
≥1, ∈[0], 01···
( X
=1
¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())
¯¯¯¯
¯
− 
(b(−1))P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b(−1))
¯¯¯¯
¯
)
·  (16)
To simplify this expression further, we focus on the second term. For nota-
tional brevity, define:
Ξ ≡
1hP
{0∈R|∃  s.t. (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())i · hP{0∈R|∃  s.t. (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b(−1))i
50
¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())
− 
(b(−1))P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b(−1))
¯¯¯¯
¯
= Ξ ·
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))
⎤
⎦ · (b())
−(b(−1)) ·
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b())
⎤
⎦
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
≤ Ξ ·
⎛
⎝
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))
⎤
⎦ · |(b())− (b(−1))|
+(b(−1)) ·
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))
⎤
⎦
−
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b())
⎤
⎦
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎞
⎠
≤ |
(b())− (b(−1))|hP
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())i
+
1hP
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())i ·¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))
⎤
⎦
−
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b())
⎤
⎦
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
1hP
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())i ·
¡ |(b())− (b(−1))|+¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))
⎤
⎦
−
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b())
⎤
⎦
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎞
⎠
51
Similarly, ¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())
¯¯¯¯
¯
− 
(b(−1))P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b(−1))
¯¯¯¯
¯
≤ 1hP
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b(−1))i ·
µ
|(b())− (b(−1))|
+
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))
⎤
⎦
−
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b())
⎤
⎦
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎞
⎠
Hence, ¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())
¯¯¯¯
¯
− 
(b(−1))P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b(−1))
¯¯¯¯
¯
≤
⎛
⎝max
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b())
⎤
⎦ 
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))
⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎞
⎠
−1
·
⎛
⎝|(b(−1))− (b())|+
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b())
⎤
⎦
−
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))
⎤
⎦
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎞
⎠
The key point from the last two expressions is that as long asX
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b())  0
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or X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))  0
then
max
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b())
⎤
⎦ 
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))
⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭ ≥ 
If both are 0, then we can ignore this term in the calculations of  (b(b(·)))
and 
³P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b(·))´, since this term is 0.
Therefore, from (16),
 (b(·)) ≤  (( · ()))
+ sup
≥1, ∈[0], 01···
( X
=1
¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())
− 
(b(−1))P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b(−1))
¯¯¯¯
¯
)
· 
≤ |R| · ( + 1) · 
+sup
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝max
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b())
⎤
⎦ 
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))
⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎞
⎠
−1
·
Ã X
=1
|(b(−1))− (b())|
+
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b())
⎤
⎦
−
⎡
⎣ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(−1))
⎤
⎦
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
⎞
⎠
¯¯  ≥ 1,  ∈ [0 ], 0  1  · · ·   ¾ · 
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≤ |R| · ( + 1) · 
+
⎡
⎣ ((b(·))) + 
⎛
⎝ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(b(·))
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ · 
≤ |R| · ( + 1) ·  +
⎡
⎣ ((·)) + 
⎛
⎝ X
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=}
0(·)
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ · 
To bound this expression, note that if 1() = ,  ((·)) ≤ ( + 1) ·
 = 1. More generally, if there is some  with () = , +1() = ,
 ((·)) ≤ () and 
³P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(·)
´
≤ .
Hence for any  ∈ R with +2() = 0,  (b(·)) ≤ (0) and b ∈ G.
The set G is obviously convex as a product of convex sets. Imposing the
1 norm topology on each component G, Helly’s theorem implies that G is
compact and hence G is compact as a product of compact sets. What remains
is to show that T is continuous. Here we use intensively its definition (15).
Let {(·)}∞=1 ⊆ G where lim→∞ (·) = (·), and thus lim→∞ (·) =
(·) for all  ∈ R and  such that () =  for some . We must show
that lim→∞ T ((·)) = T ((·)). To prove this, we must examine each node
in each admissible route independently. So let us focus on node  (subscript)
in route  (superscript) for the calculations.
Let b( · ·) be the (unique) solution to the boundary value problem
with initial conditions given by
( ·) ≡
X
{∈R|()=, +1()= for some ≥1}
(·)
Let b() be the corresponding solution to (14). Next we show that in 1,b( · ·) = lim→∞ b( · ·) exists and is a solution at initial conditions
(·). The proof traces back through Strub and Bayen’s (2006) proof that
a solution exists, detailed above, and uses an interchange of limits. The
boundary condition at each link  for the Godunov approximation is given
by:
0 = M()
Z

( ·)
0 = M()
Z

( ·)
Evidently, 0 → 0. All of the pieces of the proof in Strub and Bayen (2006)
rely on 0 as well as equalities or weak inequalities. So if they hold for every
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element of the sequence, they also hold for the limit. Thus, b( · ·) =
lim→∞ b( · ·) exists and is the (unique) solution at initial conditions
(·). Z 
0
¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b()) · b(   ())
− 
(b())P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b()) · b(   ())
¯¯¯¯
¯ 
≤
Z 
0
¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b()) · (   ())
− 
(b())P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b()) · b(   ())
¯¯¯¯
¯
+
¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b()) · b(   ())
− 
(b())P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b()) · b(   ())
¯¯¯¯
¯ 
≤
Z 
0
¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())
− 
(b())P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())
¯¯¯¯
¯ · 
+
¯¯¯ b(   ())− b(   ()) ¯¯¯ 
=  ·
Z 
0
¯¯¯¯
¯ (b())P{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())
− 
(b())P
{0∈R|for some  (0)=, +1(0)=} 0(b())
¯¯¯¯
¯ 
+
Z 
0
¯¯¯ b(   ())− b(   ()) ¯¯¯ 
We consider each of the two terms separately. For the first term, note that ˙
is bounded above by  (0 ())  ∞, so b() and b()
are both bounded away from 0 by 1 (0 ()). Hence, sets of mea-
sure 0 in time  are mapped to sets of measure 0 in the images of b(·)
and b. Using Ascoli’s theorem and passing to a subsequence if neces-
sary, b(·) → b(·) uniformly. For if not, then lim→∞ b(·) 6= b(·),
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and there are two solutions to the diﬀerential equation (10), a contradiction.
Since lim→∞ (·) = (·) in 1 norm, the convergence is a.s. Hence
(b(·)) → (b(·)) a.s. By Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theo-
rem, the first term converges to 0.
For the second term, recall that b( · ()) is defined uniquely.
Now suppose that lim→∞ b( · ()) 6= b( · ()). Then
by Helly’s theorem, we can find a subsequence of {( · ())}∞=1 con-
verging to, say, e( · ()) 6= b( · ()), where convergence is
pointwise. By a uniqueness argument given above, it must be that b( · ())
is not the exit density for a solution. From above,
Z ()
0
Z 
0
¯¯¯ e( ∆)− b( ∆)¯¯¯(∆)0()
+ 
³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ · ³Φ³ e( ∆)´−Φ³b( ∆)´´ · 0(∆)()∆
≥ 0
For  approximating the indicator function of [0 ], we have:
lim sup
→0
Z ()
0
¯¯¯ e( ∆)− b( ∆)¯¯¯(∆)
− lim inf
→
Z ()
0
¯¯¯ e( ∆)− b( ∆)¯¯¯(∆)
≥ −
Z ()
0
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´− Φ³ b( ∆)´´ · 0(∆)∆
Taking  to approximate the indicator function of [0 ()],
≥ lim sup
∆→()
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´−Φ³ b( ∆)´´ 
− lim inf∆→0
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´−Φ³ b( ∆)´´ 
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In sum, we have:
lim sup
→0
Z ()
0
¯¯¯ e( ∆)− b( ∆)¯¯¯(∆)−
lim inf
→
Z ()
0
¯¯¯ e( ∆)− b( ∆)¯¯¯(∆)
≥ lim sup
∆→()
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´− Φ³ b( ∆)´´ 
− lim inf∆→0
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ (( ∆))−Φ
³ b( ∆)´´ 
Since the left hand side (the first two terms) are zero, we obtain:
lim inf∆→0
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´−Φ³ b( ∆)´´ 
≥ lim sup
∆→()
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´ ·³
Φ
³ e( ∆)´−Φ³ b( ∆)´´ 
As in Strub and Bayen (2006, p. 558), the left hand side is 0. The right hand
side is non-negative (recall that flux Φ is increasing in density). Hence,
lim sup
∆→()
Z 
0

³ e( ∆)− b( ∆)´·³Φ³ e( ∆)´−Φ³b( ∆)´´ 
= 0
Now since Φ is strictly increasing in  , then we know that
lim sup
∆→()
°°° e( ·∆)− b( ·∆)°°°1 = 0,
implying that e( · ()) = b( · ()) a.s. (). Both e( · ())
and b( · ()) are of bounded variation, so by Lemma 2.1 and Remark
2.1 of Bressan (2000), by taking right continuous versions, they are in fact
equal, a contradiction.
Next, apply Schauder’s theorem to the space G with the 1 norm and the
mapping T . This yields existence of at least one fixed point. To show that it is
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unique, find the earliest time at which the two solutions diverge. Observe that
for given initial conditions, behavior within a link is well-defined. So if two
solutions exist and the earliest divergence between them occurs within a link,
we have a contradiction. Thus, the divergence must occur at a node. Finding
the earliest time at which such a divergence occurs, the initial conditions must
be ill-defined, a contradiction.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: A mixed strategy is a measurable map  :  → [0 1]|R|×(−1). We
use the notation  to denote a vector component of , so we impose the obvious
condition
P|R|×(−1)
=1 () = 1 almost surely in .
First, we can define a strategy distribution as
R
  ≡
|R|×(−1)Q
=1
R
 ().
Second, we notice that the proof of Theorem 1 does not use the exact dynamic
commuting route structure, but rather the strategy distribution induced by
a dynamic route structure. In other words, the proof of Theorem 1 implies
that for any given strategy distribution, there exists a unique pattern of traﬃc
flows. Information about which commuter plays each strategy is irrelevant.
Third, we define the utility of a commuter for a mixed strategy and any
strategy distribution. Fix  ∈ . The utility function (;   ) was given
in (9). For pure strategy  corresponding to () () (), this is written
as b( R ) = (;   ). We have argued that in the end the flows
depend only on the strategy distribution. For technical reasons, it is useful
here to define ( R ) ≡ −∞ if 1(()) 6= () or ()(()) 6= ();
utility was undefined for this circumstance. Then for commuter  ∈ , we
can write the utility from the use of pure strategy  (a route and time of
departure) given an aggregate strategy profile
R
 , as b( R ) and b( ) =
|R|×(−1)Q
=1
b( R ), where the dynamic route structure (  ) generates
the strategy distribution
R
 . For this to be well-defined, we are using the
fact that the utility will depend only on the strategy distribution generated
by the dynamic commuting route structure, and the fact that this can now be
chosen arbitrarily since we no longer stick to the requirement that the origin
and destination nodes are pre-specified. Finally, we can define the utility of
commuter  from using mixed strategy () by () · b( ).
It is clear from this set of definitions that our model satisfies two of the
assumptions of Schmeidler (1973), namely the measurability assumption (b)
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and the fact that utility depends only on the strategy distribution, not on
individual strategies. Assumption (a), regarding the continuity of  in its
second argument, remains to be verified.
We take a sequence of mixed strategies {}∞=1 such that lim→∞  =  in
the 1 weak topology, and prove that for each  ∈ , lim→∞ b( ) = b( ).
Our hypothesis implies lim→∞
R
  =
R
 . Let  ∈ G be the fixed point
associated with the initial conditions ,36 and let  ∈ G be the fixed point
associated with the initial conditions . Thus, we have an associated sequence
{(·)}∞=1 ⊆ G where for each , (·) = T ((·)). Since G is compact,
there is a converging subsequence. Now pass to any converging subsequence,
call it
©(·)ª∞=1 ⊆ G, where lim→∞ (·) = b(·). By continuity of T ,b(·) = T (b(·)). Hence, b = , and lim→∞  = . We use an analogous
argument below for both flows and progress along a link.
Define
F ≡
nb( · ·) measurable on [0 ]× [0 ()]
| 0 ≤ b( · ·) ≤  a.s., b( 0∆) = 0 ∀ ∆ ≥ 0o
Then we can define:
F ≡
Y
=1, 6=
F
We denote a typical element of F by b = ³b( · ·)´
=1, 6=
.
Now for each  there exists a unique solution b ∈ F associated with
initial conditions . There is also a unique flow b ∈ F associated with .
Impose the weak* topology on the flows as a subset of ∞. Applying the
Banach-Alaoglu theorem, there is a converging subsequence. Now pass to any
converging subsequence, call it
nb(·)o∞=1 ⊆ F , where lim→∞ b(·) = e(·),
where convergence is pointwise a.s. in ( ∆). As in the proof of Theorem 1,
it must be that b = e .
Now for each  there exists a unique solution  ∈ D associated with flow b.
There is also a unique solution  ∈ D associated with b . Impose the uniform
topology on the solutions as a subset of 0. Applying Ascoli’s theorem, there
is a converging subsequence. Now pass to any converging subsequence, call it©(·)ª∞=1 ⊆ D, where lim→∞ (·) = b(·).
36Although  represents a mixed strategy, as we have noted, all that matters is the dis-
tribution of initial conditions (namely the distribution over routes and departure times), so
flows and arrival times can be found uniquely for each mixed strategy profile using Theorem
1.
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Next define b(  b) ≡ b(   (b )) . Now

³ b(   (b  ))´ ≤  ³ b(   0)´ ≤ |R| · ( + 1) · 
So applying Helly’s theorem and passing to a further subsequence if necessary,
lim→∞b(  b) = b(  b)
where convergence is pointwise in  and  (b(  b)) ≤ |R| · (+1) · .
So for each ,
(b )
 = 
¡(   (b  )) ¢ =  ¡b(  b)  ¢
so
lim→∞
(b  )
 =  (b(  b) )
Next suppose that lim→∞
()
 6= 
()
 on a set of positive measure in
 . Hence, by the fundamental theorem of calculus and Lebesgue’s dominated
convergence theorem, there exists  0 such that
b(b   0) = 
0Z
0
b(b  )
  =
 0Z
0
lim→∞
(b  )
 
= lim→∞
 0Z
0
(b  )
  6=
 0Z
0
b(b  )
  = b(b   0)
This is obviously a contradiction. So lim→∞
()
 =
()
 a.s. From
(6) we know that (b b) = b(b b) = 0, so by integrating, b(·) = (·).
Fix a route  and a departure time b . Define
 ∗(b) ≡ min©0 ≤  ≤  | (b  ) = ()ª
= −1(())(b)
Now let  and 0 be origin departure time choices for route , and let  and
 0 be associated perturbations, where b =  +  and b 0 = 0 +  0. Then¯¯ ∗(b)−  ∗(b 0)¯¯ ≤ ()( ) · ¯¯b − b 0¯¯
Thus, arrival time at the final destination can be written as: b  ¡ +  0¢ =
 ∗(−1)()
³
 ∗(−2)(−1)
³
· · · ∗(1)(2)
¡ +  0¢ · ··´´. Hence,
¯¯¯b  ¡ +  0¢− b  ³b + b 0´¯¯¯ ≤ −1Y
=1
(() (+ 1))
( ()(+1)) ·
¯¯ +  − 0 −  0¯¯
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Define
Υ ≡ ©b  : [0  ]→ [0 ] measurable | ¯¯b  ¡ + ¢− b  ¡0 +  0¢¯¯
≤
−1Y
=1
(() (+ 1))
( ()(+1)) ·
¯¯ +  − 0 −  0¯¯)
By Ascoli’s theorem, Υ is a compact subset of 0.
For each  there is a unique (·) and thus a unique b  (·) ∈ Υ. There
is also a unique b  (·) ∈ Υ associated with (·). So there is a converging
subsequence associated with {(·)}∞=1. Now take any converging subsequence
of
nb  (·)o∞=1, call it nb  (·)o∞=1. It has a limit: b 0 (·) ∈ Υ. Suppose
that b 0 (·) 6= b  (·). Now since ©(·)ª∞=1 converges uniformly to (·), for each
 +  0 ∈ [0  ], lim→∞ b  ¡ +  0¢ = b  ¡ +  0¢, so in fact b 0 (·) = b  (·), a
contradiction.
Apply Schmeidler (1973), theorems 1 and 2, there exists a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies.
Finally, consider the case where Φ is non-decreasing (instead of strictly
increasing) in  , and as always Φ() ≡ () ·  . Let b() = () + , where
  0 is small. Then since () is non-increasing in  , so is b(). Moreover,bΦ() ≡ b() ·  = (() + ) ·  = Φ() +  ·  , so bΦ() is strictly increasing
in  . Apply our results to the modified game using b() and bΦ() to obtain
an equilibrium in pure strategies for each . As the number of strategies
is actually finite, we can find an accumulation point of the strategy profile as
→ 0. Using continuity of the payoﬀs (as demonstrated above), by a standard
argument the accumulation point is an equilibrium profile for  = 0.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: Given an outward bound tree network, there is no route choice. The
strategy profile we propose as a Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibrium is to dis-
tribute each type of commuter, where type is defined as an origin-destination
pair, uniformly across all departure times. Clearly this is a Nash equilibrium,
as all commuters of a given type have the same travel time and thus receive
the same utility. Now suppose that there is a strategy profile that Pareto
dominates the Nash equilibrium profile. Thus, it must be that there is some
departure time that has a higher than average density. For this departure
time, there is some type that has a higher than average density (where the
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average is over departure times for this type). The commuters of this type
with this departure time will have a longer commute than at Nash equilibrium,
contradicting that the alternative strategy profile Pareto dominates the Nash
equilibrium profile.
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